The right to speedy trial is a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Inordinate delay in concluding a trial can result in the quashing of the prosecution. Judicial compassion can be exercised to compensate a convict for the mental agony suffered due to protracted trial by reducing the sentence.

1. This revision is directed against the judgement dated 17-7-1995 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Hissar whereby the sentence and conviction of the petitioner for an offence under Section 16(1)(a)(i) read with Section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) recorded by Shri S. C. Goel, Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Fatehabad vide his judgement and order dated 19-10-1992 has been confirmed. The petitioner has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/- and in default of payment thereof to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months.

2. The facts in brief are that on 17-6-1985, Government Food Inspector Shiv Dayal accompanied by Dr. S. P. Mimani intercepted the petitioner at Rattia Octroi Post, Fatehabad while carrying two drums of cow milk each containing 18 liters meant for public sale. A public witness was joined in the party. After expressing his desire to take sample of cow milk from the petitioner, a notice was served. After the milk was made homogeneous, the Food Inspector purchased 660 millilitres of milk for analysis which was divided into three parts and after adding preservative as per rules the same was sealed in three dry and clean bottles in equal quantity. One of the samples was sent to the Public Analyst and the same was found to be adulterated as it contained milk fat and milk solids not fat deficient of the minimum prescribed standard. After complying with the necessary formalities the said Food Inspector filed a complaint for an offence under Section 16(1)(a)(i) read with Section 7 of the Act against the petitioner. By order dated 19-5-1991, the petitioner was convicted and sentenced. He challenged his conviction and sentence and the Additional Sessions Judge, Hisar vide order dated 9-5-1992 accepted appeal and set aside sentence and appeal and remanded the case to the trial Court to be tried in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Thereafter the case was ordered to be tried as warrant case. After recording the evidence and believing the prosecution evidence the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate again convicted and sentenced the petitioner as stated above. The appeal of the petitioner against his conviction and sentence did not find favour with the Appellate Court and the same was dismissed by the impugned judgement.

3. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and learned State counsel and have gone through the record of the trial Court which has been summoned at the motion stage with the consent of the counsel for the parties. It may be stated that since the finding of facts recorded by the two Courts below is concurrent and no illegality or irregularity could be pointed out, notice qua sentence only, was issued to the State.

4. Shri R. K. Jain, Advocate learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the petitioner is not a previous convict and he is only bread earner of the family and he ought to have been released on probation of good conduct. In support of this contention reliance has been placed by the learned counsel upon the judgement of the Apex Court reported as Iser Das V/s. State of Punjab AIR 1972 SC 1295 : (1972 Cri LJ 874). This was also a case under the provisions of Food Adulteration Act and their Lordships were pleased to order release of the appellant in that case, on probation. But this contention raised by the learned counsel appears to be misconceived. The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 was amended by Act No. 34 of 1976 and Section 20-AA was inserted.This Section provides as under :-

"Nothing contained in the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (20 of 1958) or Section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) shall apply to a person convicted of an offence under this Act, unless that person is under eighteen years of age."

From a bare perusal of this Section it is evident that the question of the applicability of the