The appellate court's jurisdiction to interfere with a trial court's order on an application for injunction is limited to cases where the trial court's order is erroneous in law, perverse, or based on a misreading of the pleadings and evidence.

G.S.Singhvi, J.

1. This petition is directed against the order of injunction dated 12.6.1995 passed by the District Judge, Bhiwani, which he passed while reversing the order dated 9.12.1994 passed by the Sub Judge 1st Class, Charkhi Dadri.

2. Suit filed by respondent Kamla Devi for permanent injunction against the petitioner from interfering in her possession over the disputed land and also against the raising of construction in the plot measuring 1 Kanal 1 Maria falling in Khasra No. 488 Khatoni No. 627 is pending in the Court of Sub Judge 1st Class, Charkhi Dadri. The respondent filed an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure, for grant of temporary injunction. The defendant-petitioner contested the application and challenged the locus standi of the plaintiff-respondent. After considering the rival cases, the learned Sub Judge dismissed the application. However, in appeal the learned District Judge, Bhiwani reversed the order of the trial Court and granted injunction in favour of the plaintiff-respondent restraining the petitioner from raising any construction on the disputed property.

3. First contention of Shri Goel is that the learned appellate Court has acted without jurisdiction in reversing the order passed by the trial Court. Elaborating this contention Shri Goel urged that the appellate Court had no jurisdiction to set aside the order of the trial Court without recording a specific finding that the order of the trial Court was erroneous in law or was perverse. Second contention of Shri Goel is that the trial Court had given cogent reasons for refusing the relief of injunction to the respondent, but the appellate Court has upset that order merely on conjectures and if the order of the appellate Court is not set aside the petitioner would suffer substantial injustice.

4. Shri Mani Ram argued that even though the order of the appellate Court may not be happily worded and even though it may be erroneous, this Court should not interfere with the same in exercise of its jurisdiction Under Section 115 of the C. P. C. because no prejudice will be suffered by the petitioner due to the grant of injunction in favour of the respondent. Shri Mani Ram further argued that the appellate Court was justified in passing the order of injunction because in the absence of injunction the petitioner may raise construction on the property and then it would not be possible for the Courts to undo the construction.

5. Scope of the jurisdiction of an appellate Court to interfere with an order passed by the trial Court on an application filed under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 read with Section 151, C.P.C., is well settled. The Supreme Court and the High Courts have consistently held that the appellate Court can interfere with an order of the trial Court only where such order suffers from clear violation of law or where the findings recorded by the trial Court on the issues of prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury are perverse or where the trial Court has not applied the settled principles of law for appreciation of the pleadings and evidence produced by the parties. The Courts have further held that a mere possibility of the appellate Court forming a different opinion on the basis of the facts and evidence produced by the parties cannot be a valid ground for interference by the appellate Court.

6. In Guru Nanak Education Trust v. Balbir Singh and Ors., (C. R. No. 4007 of 1994) decided on 18.4.1995 (1995-2)110 P.L.R. 625), this Court has dealt with the aforementioned issue on some length and held :

"The order refusing temporary injunction is of a discretionary character. Ordinarily court of appeal will not interfere with the exercise of discretion by the trial Court and substitute for it its own discretion. The interference with the discretionary order, however, may be justified if the lower Court acts arbitrarily or perversely, capriciously or in disregard of sound legal