The suit for declaration of an order as illegal and void is governed by the Limitation Act, which prescribes a period of three years when the right to sue accrues.

N.K.Sodhi, J.

1. The plaintiff-respondent joined the police department as a Constable and was posted in Police Lines, Bathinda. A criminal case was registered against him under Sections 420 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code in Police Station, Bathinda Cantt. On the allegation that the plaintiff had submitted a forged matriculation certificate at the time of the his enrollment in the police department. The Senior Superintendent of Police, Bathinda discharged the plaintiff from service on November 30, 1983 under Rule 12.21 of the Punjab Police Rules primarily for the reason that he had submitted a forged certificate though it was not so stated in the order. The order of discharge dated November 30,1983 was challenged by the plaintiff by filing a suit for declaration to the effect that the order was illegal, null and void and the concerned authority did not follow the proper procedure and that the order was punitive in nature.

2. The suit was contested by the State of Punjab and it was submitted that the impugned order passed by the Senior Superintendent of Police was legal and that the suit was barred by time. The trial Court held that the impugned order of discharge was illegal, null and void and that the plaintiff was entitled to the declaration sought for. While deciding the issue pertaining to limitation, it found that since the impugned order was null and void and nonest, there was no limitation for challenging the same in a civil court. The appeal filed by the State of Punjab was dismissed and the decree passed by he trial Court was affirmed and it was declared that the plaintiff would be deemed to be in service with effect from the date of his discharge and would be entitled to the arrears of salary. It is this decree that is now challenged in the present second appeal filed by the State of Punjab.

3. The only argument advanced by learned State counsel is that the suit of the plaintiff was barred by time and therefore, the Courts below were not justified in decreeing the same. It is common case of the parties that the order of discharge was passed by the Senior Superintendent of Police on November 30, 1983 and the present suit was instituted on September 27, 1989 after about 5-1/2 years of the passing of the order.

4. Having heard counsel for the parties at length, I am of the opinion that the judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court affirming that of the trial Court on issue no. 2 cannot be sustained. The suit out of which the present appeal has arisen was one for declaration that the order of discharge from service passed against the plaintiff was illegal and void. Such a suit is governed by Article 113 of the Limitation Act which prescribes a period of three years when right to sue accrues and should have been filed within three years of the passing of the impugned order. This not having been done, the suit is clearly barred by time and deserves to be dismissed on that ground alone. It has now been authoritatively held by the Apex Court that the party aggrieved by the invalidity of an order has to approach the Court for relief of declaration that the order against him is in operative and not binding upon him. He must approach the Court within the prescribed period of limitation and if the statutory time limit expires the Court cannot give the declaration sought for. The earlier law that an order which is null and void need not be so declared by the Court has been held to be not good law any more.

5. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondents then argued that against the impugned order his client had filed a representation before the Deputy Inspector General of Police which was rejected and the rejection was communicated to him on June 29, 1989 and that in view of this rejection the suit filed on September 27, 1989 could be held to be within limitation. I find no merit in this contention. Rule 12.21 of the Rules under which the Senior Superintendent of Police had discharged the plaintiff from service c