The time taken for the supply of the certified copy of the judgment should be excluded in calculating the limitation period for filing an appeal.

1. This is an application for excusing the delay in filing of the Letters Patent Appeal against the order in C.O.C.P. No. 163 of 1987. C.O.C.P. No. 163 of 1987 was considered along with three other Contempt Petitions Nos. 43, 48 and 203 of 1987. The main judgment was delivered in C.O.C.P. No. 43 of 1987 on 1-10-1988. In the other three petitions, a short order was made to the effect "same order as in C.O.C.P. No. 43 of 1987". A copy of the order in C.O.C.P. No. 43 of 1987 was applied for on 11-10-1988 and was delivered on 11-11-1988. Therefore, the limitation had not started against the order till 11-11-1988. It began to start on 12-11-1988. Thirty days from that would have expired on 11-12-1988. In the meantime, the appellant filed an application for the supply of the copy of the order in C.O.C.P. No. 163 of 1987 on 3-12-1988. That would have arrested the running of limitation on 3-12-1986. This was for the reason that an appeal against the order in C.O. C.P. No. 163 of 1987 could not be filed without a certified copy of the judgment in C.O.C.P. No. 43 of 1987. Therefore, the time taken for the supply of the copy of the order in C.O.C.P. No. 43 of 1987 is also for the supply of the copy of the order in C.O.C.P. No. 163 of 1987 will have to be excluded in calculating the time in filing the appeal. In all such cases a combined calculation excluding the time taken for each of the certified copies will have to be made for purposes of finding the limitation. The law also does not require that all the applications for supply of certified copies shall be made at the same time. It could be made separately and at different times. Only relevant factor is that the time taken for supply of certified copy alone will be excluded as calculated above. The appeal in this case was filed on 8-12-1988 and if the calculation is made with reference to the time spent in obtaining the copy of the main order in C.O.C.P. No. 43 of 1987, then the appeal is within limitation and we are of the view that applying late for the supply of certified copy of short order in C.O.C.P. No. 163 of 1987 is of no consequence. In this view of the matter, the appeal against the order in C.O.C.P. No. 163 of 1987 was in time.

2. It was contended, however, by the learned counsel for the respondents that the respondents sent certified copy of the judgment dt. 10-10-1988 to the appellant for compliance and that was received by them on 14-10-1988, and, therefore, they could have filed an appeal immediately without waiting for the expiry of the period of limitation and that amounts to gross negligence on the part of the appellant. It may be for the purpose of finding the knowledge of the appellant of the impugned order, the receipt of the same is a relevant factor and the appellant could be said to have been aware of the order on 14-10-1988. But as the copy of the order supplied to the appellant on 14-10-1988 could not be used for filing an appeal, that is not relevant for finding the limitation. The law requires that when an appeal is to be filed, a certified copy of the judgment is to be filed with it and if the certified copy is annexed with the appeal, the time taken for supplying the certified copy will have to be excluded in calculating the period of limitation. The arguments of the learned counsel that from date the copy was supplied by the respondents to the appellant the time for filing of the appeal began to run and not filing the appeal in time amounts to negligence is devoid of any merit.

3. It was next contended by the learned counsel that the copy of the order was also sent by the High Court to the appellant and that was also received well in advance and without waiting for a copy of the judgment they could have filed an appeal. This is again a matter in which it could be said that the appellant got knowledge of the order and for the reasons mentioned earlier, this ground has no substance.

4. It was then contended by the learned counsel that application