Individual good must make way to public good and all sentimentality and all the cry for commercial convenience etc. must drown before the larger cry for improvement of peace, law and order and safety of the public.

M.M.PUNCHHI, J.

1. Individual good versus Public good is the bout in the instant litigation. The State of Punjab has issued notification under Sec.4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, the Act) on June 6, 1988, Annex.-P-1 to the petition, wherein the avowed purpose disclosed is to acquire land at the instance of the Municipal Corporation of Amritsar, for the purpose of laying new public streets and for providing public parking places by the Municipal Corporation at the expense of the said Corporation. Besides, the other avowed purpose is that it would lead to beautification and redevelopment of the area around Golden Temple Complex as also serve the purpose of preserving and improving peace, law and order and safety of the public. In the notification itself, the urgency provisions of Sec.17(1) of the Act have been invoked, thereby taking away the right under Sec.5-A of the Act of raising objections. That the acquisition is to involve large built-up area is noticeable from the description of the 91 properties given in the schedule to the notification. And the property of the petitioners is at serial No. 68 thereof, being property No. 1971/VI in bazar Pepranwala.

2. The petitioners herein are the landlord of the said property and its tenants. They claim that this property has been in their possession for ages and being in close proximity of the Golden Temple Complex had high commercial value, besides sentimental value which was personal to them. They want the notification quashed.

3. The foremost attack against the notification is that the Corporation did not take resort to Sec.170 of the Punjab Municipal Corporation Act, 1976 (for short, the Corporation Act) whereunder the Corporation on decision to acquire any immovable property for the purposes of the Act, enjoins its Commissioner to acquire property on its behalf by agreement on such terms and at such price as may be approved by the Corporation. The following provision i.e. Sec.171 provides that whenever the Commissioner is unable to acquire any immovable property under. Sec.170 by agreement the Government may, at the request of the Commissioner, acquire the same under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 . Safeguard has been made therein regarding payment and charges to be borne by the Corporation in that event. It is submitted that in the notification itself the Government had avowedly exercised power under Sec.171 of the Corporation Act presumably on the Commissioner s inability to acquire the properties involved by agreement under Sec.170. A dispute of fact has been raised that there was no resort to acquisition by agreement under Sec.170 of the Corporation Act and, therefore, the foundation for the employment of Sec.171 stands knocked off. The Advocate General, Punjab, is here as caveator and he has stated before us at the Bar that such effort was made. Be that apart, whether the effort was made or not, identical provisions came to be interpreted by the Supreme Court in Kanaiyalal Maneklal V/s. State of Gujarat, AIR 1970 SC 1188, where their Lordships, repelling an identical contention, observed as follows :-

"9. Exercise of power to move the State under S.78 of the Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, to acquire land is not conditioned by any such limitation as suggested by counsel for the appellant. The opening clause of S.78(1) merely indicates an alternative and not a condition. Even if no attempt is made under S.77 to acquire the land by agreement, it is open to the Commissioner of the Municipal Corporation, with the approval of the Standing Committee and subject to the other provisions of the Act to move the Provincial Government to take steps for acquisition of the land."

Even if the question of fact remains asserted by the petitioners and not controverted on affidavit by the respondents (though the Advocate-General, Punjab, was willing to do so), the fact remains that even if no attempt was made under Sec.170 of the Corporation Ac