The provisions of the Limitation Act, including Sections 9 and 15(1), apply to execution proceedings and bar an execution application that is not filed within the prescribed period of limitation.

A.N.Grover, J.

1. In order to decide the points arising in this appeal, the facts may be stated.

2. A shop bearing No. 3755 in the main bazar, Subzi Mandi, Delhi, belonged to Chaman Rafiq Begum. On 1st October 1947 she obtained a decree for eviction against Pearey Lal and Cheda Mal, her tenants. Janki Parshad, the son of Pearey Lal, being said to be a sub-tenant. On 19th April 1949 the property of the Begum was declared evacuee property. Janki Parshad son of Pearey Lal made payments to the Custodian of rent obtaining receipts in his name. Before 1956 the shop in question was restored to the Begum. On 4th January 1956 she made an application for execution of the decree for eviction dated 1st October 1947. On 12th January 1956 she sold this property along with some other properly to Krishan Sarup by means of a deed of sale, Exhibit D. H. 2. She also assigned the benefit of the decree to the vendee, On 24th March 1956 the execution application filed on 4th January 1956 by the Begum was dismissed as unsatisfied. On 9th May 1957 an execution application was filed by Krishan Sarup who is respondent No. 1 in the present appeal. The only substantial objection that was raised related to the bar of limitation. The objection petition was dismissed on 9th April 1958. The appeal was also dismissed on 27th October 1958. Then the present appeal was filed in this Court.

3. The main question is one of limitation. One of the other subsidiary questions that has been raised is that a new tenancy had come into existence under the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 16 of the Administration of Evacuee property Act, 1950 (to be referred to as the Act) in favour of Janki Parshad and, therefore, the decree sought to be executed was no longer capable of execution. This objection was not raised in the objection petition, nor was it put into issue, although certain evidenced was led in connection with it. The trial Court decided it against the objectors but in the grounds of appeal before the lower appellate Court, no ground was directed against that part of the order of the trial Court, nor has any such ground been raised in the present memorandum of appeal before me. I, therefore, decline to allow this question to be raised at the stage of second appeal.

4. So far as the question of limitation is concerned, the lower appellate Court found that the property in question had been released or restored by the Custodian to the Begum on 2nd February 1955 and not on 30th. April 1952 as was the case of the objectors. Mr. Narula has sought to assail this finding principally on the ground that the lower appellate Court looked at a certified copy of the order of the Deputy Custodian without properly admitting it by way of additional evidence and giving an opportunity to the objectors to rebut the same. Even if that error was made by the Court below, I do not find any adequate reason for interfering with that finding. Reference has been made in the order under appeal to the proceedings in the Custodian Department where the final order was made on 2nd-February 1955 by the Deputy Custodian. The concurrent finding of the Courts below must be accepted that the date of restoration of the property to the owner was 2nd February 1955.

5. If the property remained vested in the Custodian during 19th April 1949 to 2nd February 1955, the question is whether that time could be deducted for the purposes of determining the period of limitation. According to the lower appellate Court, nothing could be done by the decree-holder during the aforesaid period and the cause of action remained suspended. It has consequently been held that the execution application dated 4th January 1956 was within time as three years had not expired from 1st October 1947 excluding the period from 19th April 1949 to 2nd February 1955 while computing the period prescribed in Article 182 of the Limitation Act. It has been contended before me that the application dated 4th January 1956 could not be