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1962 Supreme(P&H) 171

PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
Dua, J.
Janak Rani
Versus
Charan Singh
Civil Revision No. 442 of 1962,
Decided On : NOVEMBER 6, 1962

The inherent powers of the court under Section 151, Civil Procedure Code, cannot be invoked to override the express provisions of the Code.

Headnote:

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE - SECTION 151 - STAY OF SUIT - INHERENT POWERS OF COURT - CONDITIONS FOR EXERCISE - ENDS OF JUSTICE - INTERESTS OF PARTIES - SECTION 10, CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE - APPLICABILITY.

Fact of the Case:

Plaintiff, Janak Rani, filed a suit for permanent injunction restraining defendants, Chanan Singh and his son Harbans Singh, from using machinery belonging to her and lying on the premises of the partnership business. The defendants applied for staying this suit pending the final decree of the previous litigation relating to the rendition of accounts.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the order of the trial court staying the suit under Section 151, Civil Procedure Code, was without jurisdiction and tainted with material irregularities. The court found that Section 10, Civil Procedure Code, was clearly inapplicable to the case and that the final decree in the accounts suit would not operate as res judicata. The court also found that the ends of justice would not be met by staying the proceedings in the present suit.

Issues: Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to stay the suit under Section 151, Civil Procedure Code.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that Section 151, Civil Procedure Code, confers inherent powers on the court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. However, this power does not empower the court to override the express provisions of the Code and when those provisions apply, no inherent powers can be invoked so as to ignore such a provision which can legitimately be deemed to be exhaustive of the matters dealt with.

Final Decision: The court set aside the impugned order and directed the court below to proceed to dispose the suit in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above.

Judgment

Dua, J.

1. This is a plaintiffs revision of the order of the learned Subordinate Judge, Amritsar; staying the plaintiffs suit under Section 151, Civil Procedure Code.

It appears that there was some partnership between Janak Rani wife of Brij Lal, plaintiff, Kirpal Singh and Chanan Singh, defendants. There was a suit of rendition of accounts instituted by Kirpal Singh and Chanan Singh against Janak Rani in July, 1961 which resulted in a preliminary decree. Proceedings for taking of account are still going on. In February, 1962 Janak Rani instituted the present suit for permanent injuction restraining Chanan Singh and his son Harbans Singh (Harbans Singh was not a party to the previous proceedings) restraining them from using some machinery belonging to her and lying on the premises of the partnership business. The defendants applied for staying this suit pending the final decree of the previous litigation relating to the rendition of accounts. The trial Court has stated in its order that it is clear that the present suit is not between the same parties. However observing that the suit relates to the property which is lying on the floor of Guru Nanak Cotton Weeding Mills, Chheharta, the accounts of which, according to Exhibit D-2, are to be gone into, it would meet the ends of justice to stay the present case under Section 151 of the Code.

On revision it has been contended that this order is without jurisdiction or at least tainted with material irregularities.

In my opinion the submission is well founded. Section 10 is clearly in-applicable to the case in hand and even the Court below has not passed the order under this section. If the final decree in the accounts suit is not going to operate as res judicata. I do not see how interests of justice would be met by staying the proceedings in this suit and starting them after the decree is passed in the previous suit. The question which arises here is basically different from the accounts suit.

A few words may now be said about Section 151, Civil Procedure Code to which the Court below has placed reliance. This section undoubtedly confers inherent powers of the Court to make such order as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. It is to be borne in mind that it does not confer any new power but merely clarifies the position that the Court is not helpless when circumstances not covered by express provisions of the Code call for an order to promote the ends of justice, for no precise rules can be made by human agency which would exactly cover all conceivable and infinitely varying circumstances likely to arise in future. This inherent power would, therefore, be invoked only in rare cases when clearly the ends of justice demand it, because the right of a suit or to seek adjudication of his dispute speedily must not lightly be obstructed or delayed. However, this power does not empower the Court to override the express provisions of the Code and when those provisions apply no inherent powers can be invoked so as to ignore such a provision which can legitimately be deemed to be exhaustive of the matters dealt with and the Courts action must be consistent with sound general principles of law and the intention of the Legislature.

Here, I may also notice some divergence of judicial opinion on the Courts power to have a resort to Section 151 for stay in judicial proceedings. In Laxshmi Insurance Co. Ltd., Lahore v. B.K. Kaula and another, A.I.R. 1940 Lah. 85, Din Mohammed, J. observed that if Section 10, Civil Procedure Code, does not apply then Section 151 can also not be invoked to stay the suit which could not be legally stayed. The Earned Judge, however, did not refer to any case law and made this observation apparently on first impression for in Kodu Mal Jetha Nand v. Tilak Ram etc, A.I.R. 1929 Lah. 12, Addison, J., had expressly observed that even under the inherent powers of the High Court and under the powers of general super


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