The doctrine of suspension of rent applies in cases where the landlord tortiously deprives a tenant of the use of a part of the demised premises, and the landlord cannot claim any rent for the rest of the premises which the tenant still continues to occupy.

1. These two appeals have arisen in the following circumstances:

In November 1958, the appellant in both the cases Hakim Sardar Bahadur instituted a suit against his tenant Tej Parkash Singh for Rs. 812/- made up of Rs. 700/- on account of rent for the premises in suit from the 1st of September 1957, to the 31st of October 1958 and Rs. 112/- as electric charges for the same period. The tenancy and the rate of rent claimed were not disputed by the tenant, but he claimed that he was entitled to without whole of the rent from the landlord on the ground that the latter had unlawfully deprived him of possession of a portion of the leased premises.

2. On the facts found by it the trial Court held that the doctrine of suspension of rent was applicable in this case and the suit was decreed only to the extent of Rs. 109.91 nP. on account of electric charges. The findings of the trial Court on both facts and law were upheld in first appeal and the first of the two appeals is the landlords appeal in that suit. The second case arose when in February 1960, the landlord applied to the Controller under section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act of 1958 for the eviction of the tenant for non-payment of rent and he obtained an order from the Controller on the 4th of April 1960 for the deposit by the tenant of arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 1,550/- at the stipulated rate of Rs. 50/- p.m. The tenant appealed to the Rent Control Tribunal against that order and the appeal was accepted on the 28th of August 1961, on the basis of the decision of the Civil Court in the other case. The suit was still pending at the time when the order of the Controller was passed, but both the suit and the landlords appeal had been dismissed by the time the tenants appeal was decided by the Rent Control Tribunal, which I think must have deferred its decision until the decision of the appeal in the other case.

3. In the main case the facts were disputed, but the question of law involved must now be decided in second appeal on the basis of the concurrent findings of fact of the Courts below. The premises actually used for his residence by the tenant are apparently on the first floor of the building, but it has been held that a verandah measuring 9 x 7 on the ground floor which was used by the tenant in connection with his business for the storing of such articles as motor-tyres was part of the leased premises. It has also been found that the tenant has been deprived of possession and effective use of this verandah by the construction of a wall in it by the landlord. In fact it appears that it was because of this deprivation that the tenant stopped paying rent as from September 1957.

4. The question involved is whether this deprivation, amounting to eviction, from the verandah forming part of the leased premises brings into operation the doctrine of suspension of rent, and whether the tenant is entitled to withhold the whole of the rent for the leased premises so long as he is so deprived or whether he must still continue to pay such part of the rent as may he found due for the portion of the leased premises still in the occupation.

5. There is no doubt that under English law under a rule based on justice, equity and good conscience the tenant is entitled to a suspension of the entire rent either if he is evicted from a part of the demised premises or if the landlord fails to deliver possession in the first instance of the whole of the demised premises. This is stated in paragraphs 252 and 253 of Faos General Law of Landlord and Tenant, Seventh Edition, at page 156. There is however, no doubt that while this principle has been accepted to a great extent in India, it has been with modifications. Except for one or two cases which I shall discuss this modification has only been applied in cases of non-delivery and generally it has been upheld in cases of eviction from part of the demised premises. In Sm. Katyavani Debi V/s. Udoy Kumar Das, AIR 1925 PC 97 it was held