The Tribunal's power under section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is limited to giving or withholding permission to the employer to discharge or punish a concerned workman during the pendency of an industrial dispute. The Tribunal cannot just review the decision of the management but must see that the employer is not acting mala fide or resorting to any unfair labour practice, intimidation or victimisation, or there is no basis error or contravention of the principles of natural justice.

A.N.Grover, J.

1. This is an appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent against a judgment of a learned Single Judge dismissing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.

2. The appellant, which is a limited company, had in its employment Raj Kumar respondent No. 2 and Pritam Lal respondent No. 3 who had been serving as apprentices since 1954. On 26th March, 1959 these two persons exchanged abuse and had some sort of scuffle. The quarrel is stated to have been the result of some remarks attributed to Raj Kumar to the effect that the apprentices were not going to get any bonus. Both Raj Kumar and Pritam Lal were suspended on the same day and a charge-sheet was delivered to them. An enquiry was held by the management soon after. The Enquiry Officer submitted his report on 30th March 1950 holding that the fight between the two had in fact taken place but it was recommended that as they were young boys with a career ahead of them, they should be punished by only withholding their increments for one years. The General Manager issued show cause notices on 31st March 1959 in reply to which each of the aforesaid employees expressed regret and gave an assurance that such an incident would not be repeated. The General Manager, however, directed their dismissal and in his order made a mention of two earlier warnings having been given to Raj Kumar and there to Pritam Lal. An application was thereafter made by the management of the Company under sub-section (2) of section 33 of the industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for according approval to the order of dismissal. The Industrial Tribunal, which was presided over by Shri Kesho Ram Passey, declined the prayer inter alia on the following grounds:

(i) There was no evidence that any dislocation of work had been caused owing to the fight between the aforesaid two employees nor was there any allegation that they had behaved in a disrespectful manner to any officer or disobeyed his order. The General Manager in order to justify the severer penalty which he impose described the act of each workman as riotous and disorderly which represented a magnified view of the alleged misconduct.

(ii) The General Manager in his order of dismissal made mention of certain warnings having been given to these employees but there was no such mention in the charge-sheet and no evidence existed in respect of them. They were allowed no opportunity to meet that allegation.

(iii) The order of the General Manager was mala fide, harsh and vindictive as was shown by the facts enumerated in the Tribunals order.

3. The Company approached this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution for quashing the order of the Industrial Tribunal. The learned Single Judge, after reproducing the material part of the order of the Tribunal, examined the argument raised on behalf of the Company that the Tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction under section 33 by substituting its own judgment for that of the management in the matter of punishment.

The following part of his judgment may be set out to show that manner in which the learned Single Judge viewed the matter: "From the observations made by the Tribunal, it would be a fair inference to make that it regarded the punishment awarded to the young boys in the perspective of the intention with which the management was actuated. I do not understand the order of the Tribunal to mean that the order of dismissal was not the proper punishment to inflict in the case. Considering all the circumstances, Mr. Passey came to the conclusion that the punishment was indicative of the mala fide intentions of the management and there was an element of victimization in the order of punishment which had been proposed."

The learned Judge agreed with the contention of Mr. Bhagirath Dass that the scope of enquiry under section 33 by the Tribunal is very limited and if there is evidence to support the action take against a workman, it was not for the Tribunal to judge what punishment should be awarded