SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Article Pause Article
judgment-img

1961 Supreme(P&H) 114

PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
D.Falshaw and Tek Chand JJ.
Ishar Singh
Versus
Pritam Singh Jiwan Singh
Letter Patent Appeal No. 22 of 1960,
Decided On : MAY 17, 1961

A court has the discretion to refuse a declaration that a compromise is void and ineffective if it is in the interests of the minor.

Headnote:

COMPROMISE - ORDER XXXII RULE 7 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE - VOIDABLE COMPROMISE - DISCRETION OF COURT TO GRANT OR REFUSE DECLARATION - INTERESTS OF MINOR - COURT'S DISCRETION TO REFUSE DECLARATION IF COMPROMISE BENEFICIAL TO MINOR.

Fact of the Case:

A minor, Ishar Singh, filed a suit for a declaration that a compromise entered into by his guardian ad litem during the pendency of an appeal was void and ineffective and not binding on his rights. The compromise was reached without obtaining the leave of the court as required under Order XXXII Rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Code.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the compromise was in the interests of the minor and that the minor could not avoid the compromise merely because it was entered into without the leave of the court. The court also held that the court has the discretion to grant or refuse a declaration, and that in this case, the declaration should be refused as it would be against the interests of the minor.

Issues: 1. Whether a compromise entered into without the leave of the court under Order XXXII Rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Code is void or voidable. 2. Whether the court has the discretion to grant or refuse a declaration under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. 3. Whether the court should grant a declaration that a compromise is void and ineffective if it is in the interests of the minor.

Ratio Decidendi: 1. A compromise entered into without the leave of the court under Order XXXII Rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Code is voidable, not void. 2. The court has the discretion to grant or refuse a declaration under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. 3. The court should not grant a declaration that a compromise is void and ineffective if it is in the interests of the minor.

Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed, and the parties were left to bear their own costs.

Judgment

Falshaw, J.

1. This is an appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order of Dulat, J., affirming the decisions of the Court of first appeal and the trial Court dismissing the suit of the appellant Ishar Singh.

2. Briefly the facts are that one Punjab Singh had brought two suits for possession of land in which he was financed by Pritam Singh respondent on condition that Punjab Singh would make over half of the land gained by him in the event of his success. Punjab Singh succeeded in obtaining possession of about 78 bighas of land as the result of his suits, but apparently he did not carry out his part of the bargain and Pritam Singh was then forced to institute a suit for possession of his half share i. e., about 39 Bighas. Pritam Singh succeeded in the trial Court but his suit was dismissed in first appeal, and when the second appeal came to this Court the parties compromised and Pritam Singh as a result of the compromise was given about half the land he was claiming, some 19 bighas.

3. The matter was, however, complicated by the fact that during the pendency of the appeal Punjab Singh had died and his place was taken by his legal representatives who were his son Kartar Singh and the minor son of a predeCased son Jshar Singh, the present appellant, and when the compromise was reached in this Court it was apparently lost sight of by Kartar Singh, the guardian ad litem of his minor nephew, that an application under Order XXXII Rule 7 Civil Procedure Code ought to have been filed for the permission of the Court to enter into the compromise on behalf of the minor.

4. This led in due course to the filing of the present suit by Eshar Singh for a declaration that the compromise was void and ineffective and not binding on his rights. Order XXXII Rule 7 reads-

"(1) No next friend or guardian for the suit shall, without the leave of the Court, expressly recorded in the proceedings, enter into any agreement or compromise on behalf of a minor with reference to the suit in which he acts as next friend or guardian.

(2) Any such agreement or compromise entered into without the leave of the Court so recorded shall be voidable against all parties other than the minor."

5. There is no doubt that these provisions are mandatory but the question which arises in the present case is whether in a suit of this kind brought by a minor to have a compromise set aside it is or is not open to the Court to go into the question whether the compromise was in fact in the interests of the minor, and to refuse to set it aside if it finds that the compromise was in fact in the interests of the minor. There are concurrent findings of the Courts below that the compromise in this case was in the interests of the minor and I find it impossible to disagree with this view.

6. In upholding the decision of die Courts below the learned Single Judge has followed views expressed by the Lahore Court and this Court though there is no doubt that there are conflicting views of other Courts. For instance, in Suresh Chandra Saha V/s. Gobind Nath Saha, AIR 1927 Cal 798, a Division Bench has held that where a minor after attaining majority seeks to set aside a Compromise under Sub-rule (2) of Rule 7 of Order XXXII, the question whether the minor derived any benefit from the compromise or not is foreign to the enquiry. Similarly in Bhiwa Jotiba V/s. Devchand Bechar, ILR 35 Bom 322, a Division Bench has held that when a suit to which a minor is a party is compromised and no leave of the Court is obtained under Section 462 of the Civil Procedure Code the compromise does not bind the minor and is voidable and the fact that it is for the benefit of the minor or that he has derived benefit from it makes no difference.

7. On the other hand a different view was taken by Tek Chand and Beckett, JJ., in Sat Na-rain Goenka V/s. Kanti Lal AIR 1943 Lah 313. In the judgment delivered by Tek Chand, J., the cases cited above among others have been considered and the view of























Click Here to Read the rest of this document
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
whatsapp-icon Back to top