1958 Supreme(P&H) 65

PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
A.N.Bhandari and G.L.Chopra JJ.
Karnal Kaithal Co-operative Transport Society, Ltd.
Versus
State Of Punjab
Letter Patent Appeal No. 22 of 1955,
Decided On : APRIL 18, 1958

The State Government has the power and the duty to decide for itself, in the exercise of its own judgment and discretion, whether an industrial dispute exists or not, and whether such dispute should or should not be referred for adjudication to a tribunal.

Headnote:

INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947 - SECTION 10(1)(C) - REFERENCE OF DISPUTE TO INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL - JURISDICTION OF COURT TO SET ASIDE REFERENCE - WRIT OF MANDAMUS OR PROHIBITION - CONDITIONS FOR ISSUE - SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW - JURISDICTION OF TRIBUNAL TO DETERMINE ITS OWN JURISDICTION - TRANSFER OF CASE FROM ONE TRIBUNAL TO ANOTHER - CLERICAL MISTAKE.

Fact of the Case:

A dispute arose between the petitioners, a transport society, and the respondents, a workers' union. The dispute was settled on 21-8-1953 and 31-10-1953. Despite the settlement, the respondents gave a notice of strike under Section 22(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The petitioners replied that the strike would be illegal under Section 23 of the Act. The respondents were unable to concur and intimated their desire to proceed on strike on 16-5-1954. The petitioners repudiated this fresh notice and warned the respondents of the penal consequences. On 17-6-1954, the State Government referred the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act. The petitioners filed a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, seeking a declaration that the State Government had no power to make the reference and that the Industrial Tribunal had no power to transfer a proceeding pending before one Tribunal to another.

Finding of the Court:

1. The Court held that the State Government had the power and the duty to decide for itself, in the exercise of its own judgment and discretion, whether an industrial dispute existed or not, and whether such dispute should or should not be referred for adjudication to a tribunal. 2. The Court held that the duty imposed upon the State Government was not of a ministerial character but was one involving judgment and discretion. 3. The Court held that the decision of the State Government to refer the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal was neither mala fide nor arbitrary nor ministerial, but was made in the exercise of judgment and discretion conferred by law and could not be controlled by mandamus. 4. The Court held that the petitioners had no clear or unequivocal legal right to the relief to which they considered themselves entitled and that the orders passed by Government were passed in the exercise of judgment or discretion and not upon irrelevant and extraneous considerations. 5. The Court held that the writ of prohibition could not be issued to the Tribunal restraining it from dealing with the reference on the ground that the dispute was not an industrial dispute, as the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction. 6. The Court held that the objection in regard to the transfer of the case from one Tribunal to the other was not substantial, as the State Government had only corrected a clerical mistake.

Issues: 1. Whether the Court had the competence to set aside an order passed by the State Government referring a dispute to an Industrial Tribunal under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 2. Whether a writ of mandamus or prohibition could be issued to the State Government or the Industrial Tribunal in the present case. 3. Whether the State Government had the power to refer the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal. 4. Whether the Industrial Tribunal had the jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction. 5. Whether the transfer of the case from one Tribunal to another was valid.

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court held that it did not have the competence to set aside an order passed by the State Government referring a dispute to an Industrial Tribunal under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as the State Government had the power and the duty to decide for itself, in the exercise of its own judgment and discretion, whether an industrial dispute existed or not, and whether such dispute should or should not be referred for adjudication to a tribunal. 2. The Court held that a writ of mandamus or prohibition could not be issued to the State Government or the Industrial Tribunal in the present case, as the petitioners had no clear or unequivocal legal right to the relief to which they considered themselves entitled, the orders passed by Government were passed in the exercise of judgment or discretion and not upon irrelevant and extraneous considerations, and the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction. 3. The Court held that the State Government had the power to refer the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal, as the duty imposed upon the State Government was not of a ministerial character but was one involving judgment and discretion, and the decision of the State Government to refer the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal was neither mala fide nor arbitrary nor ministerial, but was made in the exercise of judgment and discretion conferred by law and could not be controlled by mandamus. 4. The Court held that the Industrial Tribunal had the jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction, as every judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal has power to determine the boundaries of its own jurisdiction. 5. The Court held that the transfer of the case from one Tribunal to another was valid, as the State Government had only corrected a clerical mistake.

Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed with costs.