IMPORTANT POINT
Impleadment--Necessary party--Bonafide Transferee--Property was purchased by revision-petitioner during pendency of suit transfer is hit by doctrine of lis pendence--Subsequent transferee could not said to have independent right for protection under Section 41 of Transfer of Property Act.

Sham Sunder, J.

1. This revision-petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, is directed, against the order dated 18.08.09, rendered by the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Ferozepur Jhirka, vide which, it dismissed the application under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, moved by Smt. Khurshidan, applicant/revision-petitioner.

2. The plaintiff, filed a suit for specific performance, on the basis of agreement to sell dated 21.09.99, executed, in his favour, by respondent No.2, for a consideration of Rs.75,000/-, in respect of the land, in dispute. The sale deed, was to be executed, on or before 17.04.2000. During the pendency of the suit, the property, was sold by defendant No. 2, in favour of the applicant. Thus, the applicant, filed an application under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, stating therein, that she was a necessary party.

3. The trial Court, dismissed the application, under Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, filed by the applicant, for impleading her, as a party.

4. Feeling aggrieved, the instant revision-petition, has been filed by the applicant/revision-petitioner.

5. I have heard the Counsel for the revision-petitioner, and have gone through the documents, on record, carefully.

6. The Counsel for the revision-petitioner, submitted that the suit, had been dismissed in default, on 24.09.07, and the sale deed, was executed, on 26.09.07, in favour of the applicant. He further submitted that the suit, was restored, on 15.11.07. He further submitted that technically, it could not be said that the suit, was pending, when she purchased the property, from respondent No.2. He further submitted that the revision-petitioner, was not aware of the pendency of the suit, and dismissal thereof in default. He further submitted that the revision-petitioner, was a bonafide purchaser, and, as such, her impleadment, as a party, was essential, so that, she may be able to protect her right. He further submitted that the order, rendered by the Court below, being illegal, was liable to be set aside.

7. After giving my thoughtful consideration, to the contentions, raised by the Counsel for revision-petitioner, in my considered opinion, the revision-petition is liable to be dismissed, for the reasons to be recorded, hereinafter. No doubt, the suit, had been dismissed in default, on 24.09.07. The sale deed, was executed, in favour of the applicant/revision-petitioner, on 26.09.07, by respondent No.2. The mere fact, that the sale deed, was executed, by respondent No.2, in favour of the revision-petitioner, in a hot haste, i.e. after two days of the dismissal of the suit in default, in itself, clearly showed that she was aware of the pendency of the same, as also the dismissal of the same in default. With a view to circumvent the provisions of law, respondent No.2, and the applicant, connived with each other, as a result whereof, the sale deed, in question, was executed, in favour of the latter by the former. When the suit, was ultimately, restored, on 15.11.07, it related back to the date of institution of the same. The suit was filed in 2000. Even the stay granted, in that suit, against the alienation of the suit property, stood restored with the restoration of the same, to the original date of the institution of the same. In Yogeshwar Education Trust v. Gurmeet Kaur and others, 2009(2) C.C.C. 345 (P&H) (D.B.), the principle of law, laid down, was to the effect that, if a suit, was dismissed for non-prosecution or in default, but thereafter, it had been restored, then for the purpose of lispendense, the restoration is to relate back to the date of presentation of the plaint. The principle of law, laid down, in Yogeshwar Education Trusts case (supra), is fully applicable, to the facts of the instant case. Since the property, was purchased by the revision-petitioner, during the pendency of the suit, the transfer is hit by the doctrine of lis-pendense, as embodied in Secti