Ajay Kumar Mittal, J.

1. Kashmir Singh, appellant herein, was defendant No. 4 in the suit filed by Kali Charan and others, the plaintiff-respondent Nos. 1 to 3. The suit was decreed by the trial Court and the trial Court decree was affirmed in appeal by the lower appellate Court.

2. The facts, in brief, are that defendant Nos. 1 and 2 were owners in possession of agricultural land measuring 28 Kanals 10 Marlas situated in the revenue estate of village Jhuppa, Tehsil Palwal, District Faridabad. The duo agreed to sell half share in the said land in favour of plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 whereas the other half in favour of plaintiff No. 3, at the rate of Rs. 1,00,000/- per acre, for a total consideration of Rs. 3,56,250/-. An agreement dated 8.7.1997 was executed between the parties and a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- was received by them from the plaintiffs as earnest money, i.e. the part payment of the amount of the sale consideration. The tentative date for execution of the sale deed was fixed for 10.6.1998 on payment of the balance sale consideration. Amongst other stipulations in the agreement, one was that the sale deed could be executed either in favour of the plaintiffs or their nominees and also that the land agreed to be sold was free from all sorts of encumbrances. It was further mentioned therein that no other agreement, prior to the agreement dated 8.7.1997 had earlier been executed in respect of the land covered under agreement dated 8.7.1997. It was pleaded that the contents of the agreement in question were read over and explained to defendant Nos. 1 and 2. The second page of the agreement to sell had been lost and the papers were completed after obtaining the certified copy of page No. 2 of the agreement to sell.

3. Defendant Nos. 1 and 2, during the prevalence of the agreement to sell, dated 8.7.1997, executed and got registered a sale deed on 7.4.1998 of a major part of the suit land, in favour of defendant No. 3, and according to the pleadings of the plaintiffs, it was so done by defendant Nos. 1 and 2 to avoid their legal obligation accrued under the agreement to sell dated 8.7.1997 whereby they had agreed to sell the land, including the one sold in favour of defendant No. 3, to them. It was pleaded that since defendant Nos. 1 and 2 sold the land at the time when they were still legally bound to sell it in favour of the plaintiffs in view of the agreement dated 8.7.1997, the sale made by them in favour of defendant No. 3, vide sale deed dated 7.4.1998 did not create any title in favour of defendant No. 3.

4. The matter did not rest here and yet another development took place. Defendant No. 3 went a step ahead of what defendant Nos. 1 and 2 had done. He further sold the land, during the pendency of the suit filed by the plaintiffs, in favour of defendant No. 4 vide sale deed dated 28.2.2000 and more importantly, it was so done when an injunction order against alienation of the land was operating against him. The plaintiffs, thus, laid challenge to the said sale as well, i.e. the sale deed dated 28.2.2000, pleading that the same was hit by the principle of lis pendens. It was next pleaded that the plaintiffs were always ready and willing to perform their part of the agreement to sell, dated 8.7.1997, but defendant Nos. 1 and 2 failed to abide by the terms and conditions of the agreement to sell, dated 8.7.1997.

5. On the above premises, the plaintiffs prayed for a decree for possession by specific performance of the above agreement to sell and for declaration to the effect that the sale deed dated 7.4.1998 vide which defendant Nos. 1 and 2 sold the land in favour of defendant No. 3 and the sale deed dated 28.2.2000 vide which defendant No. 3 further sold the land in favour of defendant No. 4 as the same did not create any legal title in favour of defendant Nos. 3 and 4. The plaintiffs also sought a decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from alienating the suit land. In the alternative, a decree fo