K.Kannan, J.

1. The tenant is the revision petitioner. The landlords petition for ejectment of the property which was a shop was on the ground of personal requirement. The petition was dismissed by the Rent Controller on a twin consideration of appreciation of evidence that the landlord had no previous experience in electronic business and the other line of reasoning was that the same landlord had earlier filed a petition for eviction in respect of the same premises but he had not set out his personal requirement as one of the grounds. The Rent Controller observed that if such a necessity had existed even in the year 1994, he would have definitely set that also as a ground. The fact that he did not take that as a ground earlier and was taking it up for the first time in the year 1997, when the petition was filed, he was evidently trying to somehow to wrest possession from the tenant under some ground or the other.

2. The landlord as an aggrieved party went on appeal and the appellate authority allowed the appeal, who on a re-appreciation of evidence on facts found that the landlord had sufficient resources to start the business. He adverted to the provisions of law and the consideration of the matter in the light of decisions of this Court and of the Supreme Court that if the landlord had given his requirement details and there was no ground to suspect the bona fides, eviction shall follow.

3. The learned counsel for revision petitioner seeks to support the finding of the Rent Controller and assail the decision of the appellate authority on the ground that the landlord did not take the ground of personal necessity as existing at the time of filing the first application which was a clear proof of the fact that the so-called necessity did not exist. It was deliberately introduced for the purpose of securing an ejectment order.

4. The fact that the landlord did not seek for ejectment in the earlier application filed in the year 1994 also on the ground of personal necessity cannot, in my view, conclusively establish the lack of bona fides. If such a ground was not pleaded, it could mean no more then stating that such a requirement did not exist for a landlord at that relevant time. The grounds of eviction which are available under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act are mutually exclusive and there is no bar against filing of petitions consecutively on various grounds, so long as, the relevant causes of action existed for approaching the Court for appropriate reliefs. An explanation is also given by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent that under the relevant provision of law under Section 13(3) of the Act, the wording in the statute is the requirement of a landlord in possession of "in the case of a residential building". This was perceived at one time as barring landlords for securing eviction on a property which is put to a non- residential purpose by a tenant. The law settled authoritatively by the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Harbilas Rai Bansal v. State of Punjab and another, 1995(2) RCR(Rent) 672 : 1996(1) RRR 69 : AIR 1996 Supreme Court 857 that the ground would be available even to a landlord, against a tenant who holds the building for non-residential purpose. The ground, in his perception which was not clearly made, became available only by the decision of the Supreme Court. Again, there could be nothing artificial about a landlord who had on an earlier occasion did not conceive of starting of a business but he had decided to start one later and the ground is so made in a subsequent petition.

5. The existence of bona fides, otherwise will be a matter of appreciation of evidence and all that the case requires in order that the landlord makes out a foundation of laying such a claim is that it

a) is required to be in his own occupation;

b) he is not occupying another residential building;

c) that he has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause. If onu