The fundamental right to go abroad cannot be curtailed during the pendency of a criminal case without specific orders based on material.

V.K.Bali, J.

1. This order be read in continuation of interim order dated June 9, 2004.

2. No reply has been filed on behalf of the respondent-State.

3. The petitioner herein is facing trial under Sections 406, 498-A, 342, 323 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, Police Station Sarabha Nagar, Ludhiana. The First Information Report came into being on the statement made by Ritu Vij to Senior Superintendent of Police, Ludhiana. It was stated by her that she was married with Amit Vij on 15.1.2003. The petitioner herein is stated to be the real sister of husband of Ritu Vij. At the time of marriage, it is the case of the complainant that dowry articles, including gold ornaments, were entrusted to the accused and after the marriage they started maltreating her and refused to return dowry articles and, thus, misappropriated the same. It has also been alleged in the First Information Report that husband of the complainant along with his mother and the petitioner pressurised the complainant to get the FDRs encashed for the purchase of car to be given in the marriage of the present petitioner. Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ludhiana, vide orders dated 6.8.2003, considering the facts and that mother and father of the petitioner have already been arrested and dowry articles have since already been recovered and further that the dowry articles are generally entrusted to the husband or his parents and in such like matters, the unmarried sister of the husband has nothing to do, allowed interim bail to the petitioner. While, however, allowing interim bail, he imposed usual conditions, like that the petitioner would not leave India without the prior permission of the Court concerned. When the marriage of the petitioner got settled with Mr. Brian Armstrong, who is a national of United States of America, she applied for permission to go abroad and it is this prayer, which has since been declined by learned Judicial Magistrate vide order dated 28.5.2004, Annexure P3. Two grounds, that prevailed with the learned Magistrate in declining the permission, were that since the bail was granted to the petitioner by learned Additional Sessions Judge, it is the said Court alone which was competent to grant permission and further that if the petitioner goes abroad she may not come back to face trial. Both these grounds, in considered view of this Court, are absolutely incorrect. Grant of anticipatory bail is competent only before the Sessions Judge or High Court. Even though, therefore, the offence may be triable by Magistrate, an application for grant of bail is made before Sessions Judge or High Court. It requires to be mentioned that in a case, if Sessions Judge may refuse to grant bail and even the High Court refuses to grant such bails, the relief may be given by Hon ble Supreme Court. The Court granting interim bail can, thus, either be the Sessions Judge, High Court or Supreme Court. The conditions imposed in the order of interim bail to go abroad with the permission of the Court, thus, can vary from the Court of Sessions Judge upto Supreme Court. If what learned Magistrate has said may be taken as correct, then in that case, an individual may have to ask for permission, in a given case, from the High Court or the Hon ble Supreme Court, as the case may be. In considered view of this Court whereas it may be doubtful as to whether the Court, granting anticipatory bail may have jurisdiction to give permission to go abroad, there cannot be any doubt that it shall always be permissible for the Court, trying the matter, to accord such permission. In no case, it can, however, be said that the Trial Court is not competent to grant such permission. Insofar as the other ground refusing to grant permission, as mentioned by learned Magistrate is concerned, the same, in considered view of this Court, borders on perversity. Learned Magistrate, it appears, has missed the most important cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that every pe