The main legal point established is the court's power to appoint a Local Commissioner for local investigation under Order 26 Rule 9 of Code of Civil Procedure and the relevance of additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 in ensuring complete justice.

V.K.Bali, J.

1. By this common order, I propose to dispose of three connected Regular Second Appeals bearing Nos. 1998, 2000 and 2001 of 1983 as the points involved in all these appeals, as conceded by learned counsel representing the parties, are absolutely the same. The bare minimum facts that need a necessary mention have, however, been extracted from Regular Second Appeal bearing No. 1998 of 1983.

2. The Punjab Wakf Board, which is a corporate body, filed a suit for possession of plot, dimension whereof has been given in the plaint, situated in the area of Panipat against respondent, Neeko. The plot was shown by the letters ABCD in red colour in the site plan, attached with the plaint. Suit was filed through Faiz Ahmad Aukaf, Officer of the Board. Case of the Board is that the plot, subject matter of dispute, comprised in Khasra Nos. 3421, 3422 and 3423, situated in the revenue estate of Panipat, was dedicated by some Muslims in very remote times for being used as a graveyard. Khasra numbers, as referred to above, as per the averments made in the plaint, were shown in the revenue record as Gair Mumkin Kabristan. In the absence of the plaintiff, the defendant took possession of the plot, subject matter of dispute, somewhere in November/December, 1971 and constructed boundary walls, knowing fully well that the plot in dispute was a part of graveyard. It is then pleaded that the Punjab Wakf Board duly constituted under the Central Wakf Act, 1954, is authorised to administer all public wakfs and properties belonging to it and to institute suits and to take other proceedings relating to recovery of wakfs properties. Suit of the plaintiff was resisted on the preliminary, and technical grounds. However, insofar as merits of the case are concerned, the defendant pleaded in the written statement filed on his behalf that he was in adverse possession of the plot in dispute since 1960. He also denied that the suit property was part of Khasra Nos. 3421, 3422 and 3423. On the pleadings of the parties, learned trial Court framed the following issues:-

"1. Whether the suit has been filed by a duly authorised person? OPP

2. Whether the property in suit is Gair Mumkin Kabristan forming part of Khasra Nos. 3421, 3422 and 3423 as alleged? OPP.

3. If issue No. 2 is affirmed, whether the property in disputes vests in the plaintiff? OPP

4. Whether the suit has been properly valued for purpose of Court fee and jurisdiction? OPP

5. Whether the suit is not maintainable without claiming relief of possession? OPD

6. Whether the defendant has become owner of the property by adverse possession? OPD

7. Whether the suit is within time? OPP

8. Whether the plaint is vague and indefinite for the reasons stated in preliminary objection No. 8? OPD

9. Whether the suit has been filed on the basis of a wrong site plan and if so to what effect? OPD

10. Relief."

3. The resultant trial culminated into the judgment and decree vide which, suit of the plaintiff was dismissed on 15.6.1982. Learned trial Court held that insofar as issues 7, 8 and 9 are concerned, same were not pressed. The suit was held to be properly valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction. Insofar as, issue No. 5 is concerned, the same was held to have become redundant. It was also held that the defendant failed to prove that he had become owner of the suit property by way of adverse possession. However, while returning finding under Issue No. 2, it was held that the plaintiff failed to prove that the suit property vested in it as it could not prove that the same was forming part of Khasra Nos. 3421, 3422 and 3423. Aggrieved, the plaintiff-Board filed appeal, which too has been dismissed, confirming the judgment and decree passed by learned trial Court, on the same grounds that prevailed upon learned trial Court. Hence, present Regular Second Appeal.

4. Mr. Arun Palli, learned counsel representing the appellant, vehemently contends that even though it may be true that while leadin