The main legal point established is that a consent decree can only be set aside on the grounds of fraud or collusion, and the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the decree.

Satish Kumar Mittal, J.

1. The defendants have filed this Regular Second Appeal against the judgment and decree passed by both the Courts below, vide which a decree for joint possession of the suit land with respect to 5/21st share has been granted in favour of the plaintiffs-respondents while holding that the consent decree dated 1.8.1960 suffered by Sadhu Ram in favour of the defendants was not binding on the rights of the plaintiffs.

2. The brief facts of the case are that one Sadhu Ram was owner of certain land and property including the land in question. He was having three wives, namely Gulab Kaur, Punjab Kaur and Kishan Devi. Gulab Kaur was issueless; Punjab Kaur was having one daughter Gurdev Kaur and Kishan Devi was having three sons and two daughters. During his life time, the said Sadhu Ram suffered a consent decree regarding some of the , land in favour of Smt. Kishan Devi, her sons and daughters, who are appellants/defendants in the instant appeal/suit The said consent decree was challenged by Gulab Kaur, Punjab Kaur and her daughter, who are respondents/plaintiffs in the instant appeal/suit. In the year 1963, Sadhu Ram expired and after his death, all the properties except the land which was subject matter of the aforesaid decree was inherited by all his legal heirs, including the parties to the instant litigation, as per their share according to the Hindu Succession Act. The only dispute was regarding the land which was the subject matter of the aforesaid consent decree. The plaintiffs filed the instant suit in the year 1964, challenging the said decree on the ground that the same was obtained by the defendants by fraud, under influence and collusive and was not binding on their rights. The defendants contested the suit on various grounds.

3. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed by the learned trial Court;-

1. Whether the suit is properly valued for purposes of court fee and jurisdiction?

2. Whether the plaintiffs have a locus standi to file the suit?

3. Whether the decree passed in suit No. 259 of 1960 is not binding on the plaintiffs for any of the reasons stated in para 3 of the plaint? OPP

4. Whether the suit is within limitation? OPP

5. Relief.

4. Issues No. 1 and 2 were treated as preliminary issues and were decided in favour of the plaintiffs. Thereafter, the other issues were also decided in favour of the plaintiffs and their suit was decreed. On appeal filed by the defendants, the learned first appellate Court reversed the finding of the learned trial Court on issue No. 2 and held that the plaintiffs were having no locus standi to file the suit and dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs. Against that judgment and decree, the plaintiffs filed RSA No. 1182 of 1965 in this Court, which was allowed vide judgment dated January 22, 1976 by holding that since Sadhu Ram died after coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, therefore, the plaintiffs being widows and daughters of Sadhu Ram have locus standi to file the instant suit challenging the aforesaid consent decree. The case was accordingly remanded to the learned first appellate court for re-deciding issue No. 3 after hearing the parties.

5. By the impugned judgment and decree dated 29.2.1980, the learned first appellate court decided issue No. 3 in favour of the plaintiffs and held that the consent decree suffered by Sadhu Ram was a collusive one and was not binding on the rights of the plaintiffs. Therefore, the finding recorded by the learned trial court on this issue was affirmed. Against the said judgment and decree, the instant appeal has been filed.

6. When the appeal was listed for regular hearing, the actual date notice was issued to the respondents as the counsel engaged by them had since expired. Since in response to the actual date notice, no one appeared on behalf of the respondents, therefore, I have heard the arguments addressed by learned counsel for the appellants and have perused the records.

7. Lea