The main legal point established in the judgment is the discretion of the court to restore a suit dismissed in default without issuing notice to the opposite party, if sufficient cause is shown, and the need for expeditious resolution of restoration matters.

Satish Kumar Mittal, J.

1. Gurnam Singh petitioner, who is the legal representative of Sewa Singh (plaintiff before the trial Court) has filed the instant revision petition against the order dated 18.10.1993, passed by the trial Court, vide which an application under Order IX Rule 4 of the Code of the Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) filed by the petitioner with other legal representatives of Sewa Singh for restoration of the suit, has been dismissed.

2. The brief facts of the case are that the aforesaid Sewa Singh was having four sons and three daughters. He was owning certain landed property. One of his son, namely Harbans Singh respondent No. 1 (defendant No. 1 before the trial Court) sold 10 kanals 17 marlas of land owned by his father Sewa Singh as his attorney in favour of his wife Smt. Baljinder Kaur respondent No. 2 defendant No. 2 before the trial court), vide sale deed dated 11.9.1989. When Sewa Singh came to know about the said illegal act, he filed a suit for declaration against respondents No. l and 2 on 8.5.1990 challenging the sale deed dated 11.9.1989 being illegal and void and not binding on his right. Pursuant to the notice issued in that suit, respondents No. l and 2 appeared. They sought time to file written statement. In the meantime Sewa Singh plaintiff expired on 22.12.1990. Thereafter, the petitioner alongwith other legal representatives (who are remaining sons and daughters of deceased Sewa Singh) filed application for impleading them as plaintiffs in the suit. The contesting respondents sought time to file reply to the said application. For that purpose, the case was adjourned to 8.2.1991. On 8.2.1991, they again sought time and the case was adjourned to 18.2.1991. On that date, none of the parties was present and the suit was dismissed in default under Order IX Rule 3 of the Code by passing the following order:

Present: None. Case called several times. It is 3.40 p.m. Suit dismissed in default under Order 9 Rule 3 CPC. File be consigned to record. Sd/- 18.2.91.

3. On 12.4.1991, the petitioner and proforma respondents filed the instant application under Order IX Rule 4 of the Code for restoration of the aforesaid suit. In the application, they stated that on 18.2.1991, the case file of the aforesaid suit was not put up before the Court and the Reader of the Court gave then 26.2.1991 as next date of hearing. On 26.2.1991, both the parties were present and the Reader of the Court asked for an application to fix the date of the case. The said application was filed by Dilbagh Singh, one of the legal representatives of deceased Sewa Singh. On that application, the next date of hearing was given as 18.3.1991. Again on 18.3.1991, both the parties came present in the Court. Then they came to know that the suit was already dismissed in default on 18.2.1991 under Order IX Rule 3 of the Code. Therefore, the instant application for restoration of the aforesaid suit was filed.

4. The aforesaid application for restoration of the suit was contested by respondents No. 1 and 2 by alleging that the application was barred by limitation and that the applicants did not properly explain their absence when the suit was dismissed in default. On that application, the learned trial court framed issues of the effect whether the suit is liable to be restored, and whether the application filed by the legal representatives of Sewa Singh plaintiff is barred by limitation? Both the parties were provided opportunity to lead evidence. Thereafter, vide the impugned order the aforesaid application for restoration of the suit was dismissed being barred by limitation.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that when the suit was dismissed in default on 18.2.1991, none of the parties was present. From this fact, it appears that there was some mis-understanding among the parties about the date of hearing. He further submitted that when on 18.3.1991, the petitioner and proforma respondents came to know t