The presentation of a plaint before a proper officer of the court, even if not the Presiding Officer, is sufficient to institute a suit within the meaning of Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

1. This is plaintiff preemptor s second appeal whose suit has been dismissed by both the Courts below.

2. By means of a registered sale deed dated 18th Dec., 1968 Smt. Jeeto daughter of Sarup sold 8 bighas 11 biswas of land in favour of Mange and Hari Kishan defendants in equal shares for sale consideration of Rs. 9,000.00 . Kehar Singh plaintiff-pre-emptor claimed superior right of preemption on the ground that he was the vendor s father s real brother. Originally the suit was filed on 17th Dec., 1969. The vendees contested the suit inter alia on the ground that the plaintiff was not related to the vendor as claimed and that the suit was barred by time. It was also pleaded that Hari Kishan defendant was minor and he was wrongly used as a major and that at the time the amendment of the plaint was sought to sue him through guardian ad litem on 22nd Dec., 1969, the suit as against him had become time barred and, therefore, the suit must fail on that ground alone. The trial court found that the plaintiff had a superior right of pre-emption as against the defendants. However, the suit was held to have been filed after limitation. The plea of the defendants-vendees that they were in cultivating possession as tenants under the vendor at the time of sale was negatived. Moreover, the defendant-vendees were held entitled to registration expenses et cetera in the amount of Rs. 1001/- in case the suit was to be decreed. However, in view of the finding on the question of limitation, the suit was dismissed. In appeal, the learned Senior Subordinate Judge (with enhanced appellate powers) affirmed the said findings of the trial Court and thus maintained the decree of the trial Court dismissing the plaintiff s suit. Dissatisfied with the same, the plaintiff has filed this second appeal in this Court.

3. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the plaint was presented on 17th Dec., 1969 to the Reader of the Court because the Presiding Officer was on leave and he directed the counsel for the plaintiff to present the same before the Naib Tehsildar who was competent to entertain the same. Thus, argued the learned counsel, the suit was filed within limitation and it could not be held to be barred by time because the Presiding Officer entertained the same on 22nd Dec., 1969. Reference was made to Rule 7 (c) of Chapter 1-B of the High Court Rules and orders, Volume 1, which is to the following effect:-

"The members of the ministerial establishment are strictly forbidden to receive petitions, plaints or other documents direct from lawyers and their clerks or from litigants except when the Judge is on leave and no other Judicial Officer is incharge of his current duties. District Judge should, however, invariably make arrangements for the reception of plaints and petitions, etc., by another officer of a Court when an officer is temporarily absent on leave, tour or otherwise. Where there is a single Judicial Officer at a station such as a Mofussil or outlying Court, arrangements should be made for the reception of plaints, petitions, documents etc. by the Tehsildar or the Naib Tehsildar in consultation with the Deputy Commissioner."

4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the lower appellate Court on appreciation of the evidence has come to the conclusion that the plaint was presented in the Court of Naib Tehsild ar Jhajar and the plaintiff has failed to prove that he was authorised by the District Judge, Rohtak to entertain the plaint in the absence of the Presiding Officer and thus the plaint will be deemed to have been filed on 22nd Dec., 1969 when it was presented to the Presiding Officer of the Court.

5. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties on this question, I am of the considered view that the plaintiff could not be allowed to suffer on account of the acts and omissions of the officer of the Court. Admittedly, the Presiding Officer was on leave on 17th Dec., 1969. The plaint was p