The limitation period for initiating contempt proceedings begins from the date of the alleged contempt, and the terminus ad quem in criminal contempt varies based on the mode of taking cognizance as provided in Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act.

S.S.SANDHAWALIA, J.

1. The true termini for the determination of the limitation prescribed by Section 20 for proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is the significant and somewhat intricate question necessitating this reference to the Full Bench.

2. The five petitioners had preferred an application under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter called the Act) before the Advocate General, Punjab on Feb.27, 1981 for securing his consent in order to institute an action of criminal con- tempt against the three respondents-police officials. The alleged contempt inter alia was said to be committed by the filing of false affidavits by the three respondents on Dec.17, 1980 in an earlier habeas corpus matter in Criminal Writ No.163 of 1980, (Manjit Singh V/s. Darshan Singh. D.S.P.) decided on January 19, 1981. However, it was not till July 2, 1982 that the learned Advocate General, Punjab accorded his consent to the filing of a contempt petition against the respondents. After securing a copy of the said order, the present petition for contempt was instituted in this Court on July 21, 1982. When the matter came up for hearing before the Division Bench, an objection was surprisingly raised by the Assistant Advocate General, Punjab himself that the contempt petition was barred by time having been instituted in Court beyond a period of one year from the date of the filing of the false affidavits on Dec.17, 1980 and was, therefore, hit by Section 20 of the Act. Primary reliance for this objection was placed on two Division Bench judgments in Hari Nandan Agrawal V/s. S.N. Pandita, AIR 1975 All 48 and Gulab Singh V/s. The Principal, Sri Ramji Das, AIR 1975 All 366. Expressing some disagreement with the view in the said authorities and also because of the significance of the question, the matter was referred for a decision by the larger Bench.

3. Herein particularly the answers to the questions arising for determination must turn on the peculiar and somewhat imprecise language of Section 20 of the Act which is in the following terms :-

"Limitation for actions for contempt-No Court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or other wise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed."

It is axiomatic and indeed was not seriously disputed before us that the limitation prescribed in Section 20 of the Act is applicable both in the field of civil as also of criminal contempt. However, we are primarily concerned with the issue of criminal contempt. Now barring the somewhat unusual case of contempt in facie curiam expressly provided for in Section 14 of the Act, the succeeding Section 15 introduces certain pre-requisites for the cognizance of criminal contempt. An analysis of this section would indicate that such contempt may be taken cognizance of :-

(i) on the Courts own motion;

(ii) on the motion of the Advocate General;

(iii) on a motion made by any other person with the consent in writing of the Advocate General; and,

(iv) on a reference by a subordinate Court. It is evident that in the case of criminal contempt at the instance of the ordinary litigant, pre-requisite is the written consent of the Advocate General before the High Court can take cognizance thereof. Consequently, proceedings have first to commence before the Advocate General for satisfying him and securing his consent under Section 15 (1) (b) of the Act.

4. With the aforesaid background of Section 15 a broad analysis of Section 20 would indicate that it seeks to prescribe both terminus a quo and terminus ad quem for any proceedings for contempt to be commenced under the Act. Logically, one must first consider the starting point or the terminus a quo visualised and prescribed by Section 20 of the Act. Before us, two rival dates were canvassed in this context and these may be precisely noticed as under :-

(i) the date of the alleged commission of crimin