The limitation for a suit to pre-empt the sale would start from the execution of the sale deed and not from the date of its registration.

1. This is defendants second appeal against whom the suit for possession by way of pre-emption was dismissed by the trial Court, but was decreed in appeal.

2. Mst. Mado sold the suit land for a sum of Rs. 3,500.00 to Chhaju and Teka, defendants-appellants vide registered sale deed dated May 21, 1969. The suit was filed on May 27, 1970, by the plaintiff-respondent claiming herself to be the daughter of the vendor Mst. Mado. The suit was contested on behalf of the defendants on the ground that the plaintiff was not the daughter of the vendor, as alleged and, thus, she had no right to pre-empt the land. A specific plea was taken that the suit was barred by time as they had taken physical possession of the suit land on the date of the sale in their favour and, therefore, the suit filed on May 27, 1970, was beyond limitation under Article 97 of the Limitation Act read with Sec.30 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act (hereinafter called the Act). On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the following issues:

1. Whether the plaintiff is the daughter of the vendor and to what effect?

2. Whether the sale price was paid and fixed in good faith ?

3. What is the market value of the land, in dispute, on the date of its sale?

4. Whether the vendees are entitled to the expenses of transaction? If so, to what amount?

5. Whether the suit is within limitation?

6. Whether the vendees are entitled to the expenses for carrying out improvements?

7. Relief.

All the issues except issue No. 5, in regard to limitation, were found in favour of the plaintiff and consequently, her suit was dismissed. The trial Court held that the limitation would start from May 21, 1969, as the possession of the suit land was delivered on that day to the vendees-defendants and it was so admitted by the plaintiff herself also who appeared as P.W. 1. In appeal, the learned Additional District Judge, reversed this finding of the trial Court and, thus, decreed her suit. Dissatisfied with the same, the defendant-appellants have come up in second appeal to this Court.

3 The only question to be determined in this case is : whether the suit was filed within time or not ? Admittedly, the sale deed was executed and attested on May 21, 1969, but was entered in the registration book on June 5, 1969. The suit has been filed on May 27, 1970. According to Sec.30 of the Act, read with Art.97 of the Limitation Act, the limitation is one year to enforce the right of pre-emption and the time begins to run when the purchaser takes, under the sale sought to be impeached, the physical possession of the whole or part of the property sold or where the subject-matter of the sale does not admit of physical possession of the whole or part of the property, when the instrument of sale is registered. The trial Court clearly held that the vendees took the possession of the suit land on the date of the attestation of the sale deed, i.e., May 21, 1969 and it is so mentioned in the sale deed, Exhibit D-1, Chhaju, vendee, D.W. 7, also claimed the same. Besides, the plaintiff, who appeared as P.W. 1, also admitted the same. Therefore, ultimately, it was held that the limitation would start from May 21, 1969 and not from the date when the sale deed was actually entered in the registration book on June 5, 1969. The lower appellate Court has observed that in the present case, there is a recital in the sale deed that the possession had already been delivered to the vendees before the execution of the sale deed and, therefore, the possession could not be deemed to have been transferred under the sale and, under the circumstances, the limitation would start from the date of the actual registration, i.e. June 5, 1969. Reliance in this behalf was placed on Bai Chander Mani V/s. Bhagirath, AIR 1961 Punj 296. This finding recorded by the lower appellate Court is against the record. In the sale deed, Exhibit D-1 it is nowhere stated that the possession had already been delivered before the execution of