The meeting to consider a motion of no confidence against the Sarpanch must be convened within the prescribed period under Section 9(4) of the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act.

S.S.SANDHAWALIA, J.

1. A veiled doubt raised by counsel about the observations of the Division Bench in Harbans Lal V/s. Director, Gram Panchayat and Development, Punjab, Civil Writ No. 3968 of 1980 decided on 11th of December, 1980 had alone necessitated this reference to the Full Bench.

2. From what follows hereinafter, any detailed reference to the facts is rendered unnecessary. Suffice it to mention that in the present case, an application under sub-section (3) of Section 9 of the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act to move a motion of no confidence against the Sarpanch was made on the 29th of September, 1980. The Block Development and Panchayat Officer issued notices on the 4th of October, 1980 for convening a meeting on the 14th of October, 1980 of the Gram Panchayat to consider the same. It is thus plain that the meeting was convened within the prescribed period of 15 days under Section 9(4) of the Act and learned counsel for the parties are wholly agreed that there is no infraction whatsoever of the said provisions on this score.

3. From the above it seems manifest that the observations in Harbans Lal s case (supra) are not even remotely attracted here. Therein the application for the motion of no confidence had been given on the 15th of Oct., 1980 and the meeting had been convened for the 5th of November, 1980. It was thus the admitted position before the Division Bench that the meeting having been convened 21 days after the application, the same was plainly beyond the prescribed period of 15 days under S.9(4) of the Act. It was on that factual matrix alone that the Division Bench had observed on the validity of such a meeting. Indeed counsel for the parties agree that this situation does not arise in the present case.

4. Now once it is so, it is well settled that superior Courts are chary of adjudicating on academic issues which do not directly arise. It is common ground that on the remaining issues this case has now to be decided on the merits on its particular facts. We, consequently direct that it be placed before a single Bench for decision.

KULWANT SINGH TIWANA, J.

5 I agree.

S.S.KANG, J.

6 I also agree.