The judgment established that the power to grant or refuse sanction for prosecution under the Dowry Prohibition Act is administrative in nature and not subject to correction under specific provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Constitution of India.

Madan Mohan Punchi, J.

1. In this petition challenge has been made to an order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Ludhiana, declining sanction under Section 8-A of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 , to prosecute the respondents. The facts giving rise thereto are not necessary to be noticed.

2. Under Section 8-A of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which is applicable in PUnjab only, the District Magistrate or such officer as the State Government may by special or general order appoint in this behalf, is entitled to grant or refuse sanction a prosecution against any person in respect of any offence committed under the Act. Without such sanction no prosecution can be instituted against any person, in respect of any offence committed under the Act, before any Court. The question mooted is whether the power conferred on District Magistrate or such officer appointed for the purpose is administrative or quasi-judicial.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on Boota Singh and others v. Sudarshan Kaur, 1980 Magistrate Law Journal 32, rendered by K.S. Tiwana, J. to contend that in that case the sanction granted by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate had been quashed under Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, on the ground that the said officer had no territorial jurisdiction to grant sanction. Therefrom it is deduced that the Court had power to interfere under Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, in the matter of sanction. Plainly in that judgment no such question arose as has arisen in the present one. Decision are not wanting under of Code of Criminal Procedure, to the effect that the grant or refusal to grant sanction is purely within the administrative functions of the State of the authority on whom the statute confers powers Administrative errors cannot be corrected under Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure; that is the domain of Article 226 of the Constitution of India whereunder such orders are capable of being challenged, though again in this Court but in different proceedings. For the foregoing reasons I hold that this petition can lie neither under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure nor under Article 227 of Constitution of India, the order being administrative in nature. Dismissed. The petitioner may, if so advise avail of remedies in accordance with law. Petition dismissed.