The court fee payable on a Memorandum of Appeal under Sec. 11 of the Punjab Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1953, is ad valorem in accordance with Sec. 8 read with Sch. I Art. 1 of the Court-fees Act, 1870.

S.S.SANDHAWALIA, J.

1. Whether the court-fee payable on a Memorandum of Appeal under S.11 of the Punjab Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable property Act, 1953, has to be ad valorem in accordance with S.8 read with Sch. I, Art.1 of the Court-fees Act, 1870, or is a fixed one under Sch. II, Art.11 of the said Act is the pristinely legal question which falls for determination before Full Bench. More pointedly at issue is, the correctness of the Division Bench judgement, (in this context) in Kanwar Jagat Bahadur Singh V/s. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 Punj 32.

2. In view of the purely legal nature of the question, it is indeed unnecessary and wasteful to advert to the facts. It suffices to say that there is a patent, discordance of judicial opinion with regard to the court-fee payable on a Memorandum of Appeal under Sec.11 of the Punjab Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1953 (hereinafter called the Act ), in two Single Bench judgements of this Court in C.M. No. 2091-C-II-81 in F.A.O. No.269 of 1979 (Kanwaljit Singh V/s. State of Punjab), decided on Sept. 3, 1979: and, F.A.O. No.185 of 1980 (Maha Singh V/s. State of Haryana through Senior Sub-Judge, Gurgaon as Arbitrator), decided on Dec. 15, 1980. The issue has therefore, been pointedly raised with regard to the court-fee payable on cross-objections No.36 of 1981 in F.A.O. No.466 of 1980. (Union of India V/s. Girdhari Lal), and the matter has been placed before this Full Bench for an authoritative decision.

3. It appears to me that for once the strict discipline of the doctrine of predecents cuts the Gordian knot of controversy cleanly in this context. The issue is now clinched by a binding precedent of the final Court. This obviates any consideration on first principles and even on the language of the statute because I am inclined to take the view that the ratio of Sahadu Gangaram Bhagade V/s. Special Duty Controller, Ahmedabad, AIR 1971 SC 1887, now squarely governs the issue and it, therefore, suffices to indicate how the same is clearly and inexecrably applicable in the present case as well.

4. It is apt to advert at the very outset to the Division Bench judgement in Kanwar Jagat Bahadur Singh s case (AIR 1957 Punj 32) (supra), which, as yet holds the field within this jurisdiction. Therein, the identical question before us had come up for consideration. In taking the view the Division Bench was primarily influenced by the undermentioned four premises :-

(i) that Sec.8 of the Court-fees Act was not the charging section, and in fact the charging provisions were Schedules I and II thereof, with the result that Sch. II, Art.11 would govern the issue :

(ii) that the Award of the Arbitrator under the Act not being a decree or an order having the force of a decree, the matter would come within the language of Schedule II, Art.11 of the Court-fees Act :

(iii) the primary reliance was placed on the single Bench judgement in Hiraji Virji Jangbari V/s. Government of Bombay, AIR 1945 Bom 348 and the view therein was unreservedly followed, and :

(iv) the Division Bench dissented from the contrary view of Rankin, C.J., in Ananda Lal Chakrabutty re : AIR 1932 Cal 346 and in Debi Din V/s. Secretary of State, AIR 1939 All 127.

5. That all the aforesaid premises have now been completely over-turned by Shahadu Gangaram Bhagade s case (AIR 1971 SC 1887) (supra) thus shattering cornerstone of the ratio in Kanwar Jagat Bahadur Singh s case (AIR 1957 Punj 32) (supra) appears to me as manifest. In order to appreciate this, one has to keep in mind that the relevant provisions of Sec.7(1) of the Bombay Court-fees Act 1959 which had fallen for interpretation in the Bombay High Court and later before their Lordships of the Supreme Court as well, and those of Sec.8 of the Court-fees Act, 1870, are in pari materia and it is, therefore, apt to juxtapose them against each other :-

S.8 of the Court-fees Act, 1870. S.7(1) of the Bombay Court-fees Act.

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