The power conferred on the State by the Land Acquisition Act to acquire land compulsorily should be exercised reasonably and fairly, which necessarily means that the award must be passed with reasonable expedition.

1. Two notifications issued by the State Government under Ss.4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act (for short the Act) on Nov. 4, 1977 and Oct. 24, 1980, respectively, for the acquisition of 174.46 acres of land including the land of the petitioners in these Writ Petitions Nos.371, 309 and 372 of 1981, situated within the revenue estate of Atmadpur, Tahsil Ballabgarh. District Faridabad, are impugned primarily on the grounds that (i) there has been no compliance of the provisions of sub-sec.(1) of S.4 of the Act in as much as substance of notification has not been published in the locality concerned simultaneously with its publication in the Gazette and (ii) there was no bona fide need for acquiring the property in question and the notifications had been issued for a collateral purpose of pegging down the prices to the date of the notification and thus amounted to abuse of power.

2. On behalf of the respondents, it has been explained in their return that the substance of the notification issued under S.4 of the Act was published on Nov. 9, 1977 and this fact is evidenced by the Rapat Roznamcha No.104 dated Nov. 9, 1979, recorded with the Halqa Patwari; acquisition proceedings are in progress and the petitioners would be paid due compensation in accordance with law before taking over the possession from them.

3. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties I find merit in the above noted two contentions raised by the petitioners. Even if the stand of the respondents to the effect that the substance of the notification was published in the locality concerned is accepted as correct - though it is seriously being disputed by the learned counsel for the petitioners with the allegation that the entry in the Roznamcha of the Patwari is only a paper transaction - still I find no explanation whatsoever for the delay that has occurred between the dates of the publication of the notification in the Gazette and the alleged publication of its substance in the locality concerned. In the absence of any such explanation, the proceedings emanating from the impugned notification are obviously rendered void. This has been so ruled by a Full Bench of this Court in Rattan Singh V/s. State of Punjab, (1976) 78 Pun LR 545 : (AIR 1976 Punj and Har 279). Yet in another Division Bench judgement of this Court in Murari Lal Bhargava V/s. State of Haryana, 1977 Rev LR 337, the delay of six days between the two dates. i.e., the date of publication in the gazette and in the locality concerned, in the absence of any explanation on the part of the acquiring authorities for the same, was found to be enough to quash the impugned notifications.

4. In support of his second contention, the learned counsel relies on the following indisputable facts. The impugned notification under S.6 was issued just ten days before the expiry of the statutory period of three years from the issuance of the notification under S.4 of the Act. Earlier to the issuance of the notification under Sec.4 of the Act on Nov. 4, 1977, a similar notification had been issued on Oct. 1, 1973 but that notiflcation automatically lapsed as it was not followed by a notification under S.6, within the prescribed period of three years. No further action except the publication of the two notifications has been taken by the authorities concerned to complete the acquisition proceedings either till the filing of these petitions or even till today. So much so, even a notice under S.9 of the Act has not been issued to the landowner-claimants, what to talk of the assessment of compensation payable to them. It is on the basis of these premises that the learned counsel maintains that the sole purpose of issuing these two impugned notifications was to peg down the prices to the date of notification under S.4 of the Act for future acquisition of this land. This abuse of power of compulsory acquisition, according to the learned counsel, cannot possibly be allowed. The delay or non-action on the part of t