1981 Supreme(P&H) 267
PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
D.S.Tewatia, J.
Prithipal Singh
Versus
Magh Singh
Civil Revision No. 521 of 1981,
Decided On : OCTOBER 1, 1981
The tacit permission granted by the court for filing a suit under Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code is valid and satisfies the requirement of the provision.
Headnote:
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1908 - SECTION 92 - SUIT FOR REMOVAL OF TRUSTEE - JURISDICTION OF COURT - APPROVAL OF COURT OR ADVOCATE GENERAL - NECESSITY - PROCEDURE FOR GRANTING LEAVE - TACIT PERMISSION - VALIDITY.
Fact of the Case:
Plaintiffs filed a suit for removal of the defendant as the manager of a Dharamshala and for restraining him from alienating the land attached to it. The defendant challenged the jurisdiction of the court and the validity of the leave granted for filing the suit.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the suit was maintainable in the subordinate court as it was empowered by the government to try such suits. The court also held that the tacit permission granted by the court for filing the suit was valid and satisfied the requirement of Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code.
Issues: 1. Whether the court had jurisdiction to try the suit? 2. Whether the approval of the court or Advocate General was necessary before filing the suit? 3. Whether the tacit permission granted by the court for filing the suit was valid?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code allows suits for removal of trustees to be instituted in the principal civil court of original jurisdiction or in any other court empowered by the state government. 2. The gradation list issued by the Punjab government empowered all subordinate judges in the state to hear suits under Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code. 3. The grant of leave is a condition precedent to the filing of a suit under Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code. 4. The court can grant tacit permission for filing the suit, and such permission satisfies the requirement of Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code.
Final Decision: The petition was dismissed with no order as to costs.
1. The respondents along with the plaintiff moved an application in compliance with the requirement of S.92 Civil P.C. seeking the requisite permission for filing the suit for the removal of Prithipal Singh petitioner herein from the Managership of the Dharamshala Kohala Tahsil Zira, and for restraining him from alienating in any way the land attached to it measuring 113 Kanals 13 Marlas and bearing Khasra numbers mentioned in the plaint.
2. Petitioner-defendant filed the written statement to the plaint on 6th Dec., 1980. The case was adjourned to 13th Dec., 1980 for framing of issues and for the reply of the petitioner-defendant to the application for grant of leave to the filing of the suit. On 13th Dec., 1980, reply to the said application was filed. The stand taken by the petitioner-defendant in the reply to the application was that the Court could not grant any permission regarding the filing of the suit under S.92 Civil P.C., mandatory provision of the said section had been violated by the plaintiffs, as they did not obtain the requisite permission of the Advocate General before filing the suit. An objection to the jurisdiction was also taken. This led to the framing of the following two preliminary issues as under :-
1. Whether the Court has got any jurisdiction to try this suit?
2. Whether the approval of the Court or Advocate General is necessary before filing the suit?
3. Both the issues were decided against the petitioner defendant and preliminary objections were thus overruled.
4. It was argued before the trial Court in regard to the jurisdiction of the Court that only District Judge as the principal Court of Civil Jurisdiction, had the competence to try the suit.
5. Mr. Jain, counsel for the petitioner has reiterated the very submission and has canvassed that unless there was any notification empowering the trial Court in question, the trial Court could not try the suit. He has sought sustenance from a decision of this Court reported in Gangagir Chela V/s. Rasal Singh, (1965) 67 Pun LR 592 : (AIR 1965 Punj 472) and drew pointed attention to the finding that under S.92 Civil P.C. it is not only the institution of the suit but its subsequent trial and disposal also must take place in the Court of the District Judge, that however, under S.21 of the Punjab Courts Act or S.76 of the Pepsu Judicature Ordinance the District Judge can assign a part of the business pending before him to the Additional District Judge and when he does so, the latter can exercise the same powers and functions which the District Judge could, and that a suit under S.92 of the Code must be instituted in the Court of the District Judge but there is no bar or prohibition against the exercise of his powers assigning the business to the Additional District Judge and once such suits are assigned to him he would be as competent to deal with it as the District Judge.
6. In my opinion there is no merit in the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner. Gangagir s case (AIR 1965 Punj 472) (supra) was a case which was tried by the Additional District Judge, his competency to try the suit was questioned and it was in that context that it was said that the suit had not only to be instituted assuming that the suit could only be instituted in the Court of principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, i.e., the District Judge but had also to be tried by him unless he exercised authority conferred on him under the provisions of S.21 of the Punjab Courts Act and S.76 of the Pepsu Judicature Ordinance and was to transfer the case for trial to the Additional District Judge. Relevant provision of S.92 of the Code is in the following terms :-
"92(1). In the case of an alleged breach of any express or constructive trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature, or where the direction of the Court is deemed necessary for the administration of any such trust, the Advocate, General, or two or more persons having an interest in the t