Transfers of land in excess of permissible area under the Punjab law or the Pepsu law, if made prior to 30th July, 1958, are protected under S. 8(1) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972.

PREM CHAND JAIN, J.

1. The facts of this case may briefly be stated thus : Chandgi, respondent, owned 44 standard acres and 15-1/4 units of land in the revenue estate of village Jatola, tehsil and district Sonepat, on 15th Apr., 1953. Out of this land, 4 bighas and 4 biswas of land was under a dohlidar tenant and 6 bighas and 7 biswas of land was under old tenants on 15th Apr., 1953. There is no dispute that the area with the dohlidar tenant and the old tenants had to be excluded while determining the surplus area of Chandgi. On 10th Dec. 1957, Chandgi sold away 19 standard acres and 6-1/2 units of land to one Teka of village Mandora through a registered sale deed. Attar Singh son of Chandgi filed a suit to pre-empt the sale made in favour of Teka. A decree for possession by pre-emption was passed in favour of Attar Singh on 14th Jan. 1959.

2. The surplus area case of Chandgi was taken up by the Collector and on 26th Nov. 1959. 14 standard acres and 15-1/4 units of land was declared surplus, in his hands. While declaring this area as surplus, the land acquired by Attar Singh by pre-emption was ignored. The appeal, the revision and writ petition in this Court filed by Chandgi did not succeed. Thereafter, Attar Singh son of Chandgi, respondent, filed a writ petition in this Court, which was allowed on 3rd April, 1975, on the ground that he being a transferee was entitled to a notice before the surplus area of Chandgi respondent could be determined. The matter went back to the Collector, who vide his order dated 27th Nov. 1975, excluded the area obtained by Attar Singh through the pre-emption decree; with the result that no surplus area was left in the hands of Chandgi respondent. The State Government challenged the aforesaid order by filing a revision petition before the Financial Commissioner, which was allowed on 16th Aug. 1977 resulting in the setting aside of the order of the Collector, dated 27th Nov. 1975. Feeling aggrieved from the order of the Financial Commissioner, Chandgi filed Civil Writ Petition No. 2532 of 1977 in this Court. Though the learned single Judge was prima facie of the view that Attar Singh could not take benefit of the pre-emption decree, yet in view of the Division Bench judgement of this Court in Harpal Singh V/s. State of Punjab, 1970 Pun LJ 159, it was held that the land acquired by Attar Singh through the pre-emption decree could not be taken into consideration while declaring the surplus area of Chandgi respondent. Consequently, the writ petition was allowed and the order of the Financial Commissioner was set aside.

3. Feeling aggrieved from the judgement and order of the learned single Judge, present appeal under Cl. X of the Letters Patent was filed by the State of Haryana and others. When the appeal came up for final hearing, the only contention raised before the Bench by the learned Additional Advocate General was that the judgement in Harpal Singh s case (1970 Pun LJ 159) (supra) was not applicable to the facts of the case in hand, as in that judgement the interpretation of the provisions of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Pepsu Act ) was involved, while in the present case we are concerned with the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the Punjab Act ), which are quite different from the provisions of the Pepsu Act. The learned counsel further submitted that the Division Bench judgement of this Court in Chattar Singh V/s. Financial Commissioner, Revenue, Haryana, 1970 Pun LJ 487, though given in a case in which the provisions of the Punjab Act were involved, does not lay down correct law, as the same is based on the judgement of Harpal Singh s case (supra), and has not taken into consideration the distinction which exists between the provisions of the two Acts.

4. Finding some merit in the contention of the learned Additional Advocate General, the case was referred to a larger Bench f