A Hindu widow who acquires property for maintenance under a compromise decree has a pre-existing right to the property, and therefore the provisions of Section 14 (2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, do not apply. As a result, she becomes the absolute owner of the property after the commencement of the Act and has the power to alienate it.

1. This order will dispose of Regular Second Appeals Nos. 589 and 419 of 1980, as both have been filed against the same order.

2. The plaintiff-appellant has filed this appeal against the judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge. Jullundur, dated 12th November, 1979. whereby the decree of the trial Court dismissing the plaintiff s suit was maintained.

3. Natha Singh, grand-father of the plaintiffs Tirath Singh and Harbhajan Singh and Mehnga Singh, defendant, was the owner of the suit land. After his death, the land was mutated in favour of Smt. Banti widow of Santa Singh (wife of pre-deceased son of Natha Singh). In the year 1942, the plaintiffs filed a suit for possession of the said land on the ground that Natha Singh had executed a will dated 4th July, 1938, in their favour. The suit was compromised and on the basis of that compromise, 20 Ghumaons of land was given to Smt. Banti by way of maintenance and she was given restricted estate, inasmuch as she was to keep this 20 Ghumaons of land in her possession till her death and not to alienate the same in any manner. Meanwhile, consolidation of holdings took place in the village and she gifted the land measuring 136 Kanals 10 Marlas to Manmohan Singh and Manjit Singh sons of Puran Singh defendants by means of a gift-deed dated 27th January, 1976.

4. Thereupon, Tirath Singh and Harbhajan Singh, plaintiff-appellants, filed the present suit, out of which these appeals have arisen, for declaration that the gift-deed made in favour of the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 by Smt. Banti was null and void and was ineffective against their rights, as under the compromise and the decree of the Civil Court both dated 20th June, 1942, the land in suit was given to her as a life estate for maintenance on the condition that after her death the property would go to the present plaintiffs. It was also pleaded inter alia, that the gift was not complete and perfect as no possession was ever delivered to the donees which was the sine-qua-non of the gift. The suit was contested by defendants Nos 1 to 3 i.e. the donees and the donor who was alive at the time of the filing of the suit. They denied the plaintiffs allegations and alleged that Smt. Banti was the absolute owner of the suit land and she validly executed the gift-deed in question in their favour. The said gift-deed is, therefore, valid and binding upon the plaintiffs. It was further alleged that since Smt. Banti was the absolute owner of the property in dispute, the plaintiffs had no locus-standi to file the suit.

On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the following issues:-

1. Whether the suit is maintainable?

2. Whether deceased Banti had restricted estate without any power of alienation by way of gift of the property in dispute as alleged in the plaint?

3. Whether deceased Banti made a valid gift in favour of defendants Nos.1 and 2? If so, what is its effect?

Issues Nos. 1 and 2 were decided by the trial Court against the plaintiffs and issue No. 3 was decided in favour of the defendants, and, consequently, the plaintiff s suit was dismissed. In appeal, the findings of the trial Court on all the issues have been maintained, and, consequently, the appeal was dismissed. Feeling aggrieved against this concurrent finding of the two Courts below, the plaintiff-appellants have come up in appeal to this Court.

5. The learned counsel for the appellants vehemently contended that Smt. Banti had a restricted estate without any power of alienation by way of gift of the property in dispute and it has been wrongly held by the Courts below that she had become the full owner thereof by virtue of the provisions of Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 . According to the learned counsel, the case was not covered by the provisions of Section 14 (1) but it would be governed by the provisions of Section 14 (2), as the suit property was acquired by Smt. Banti under a decree prescribing a restricted estate in that prop