The main relief sought by the plaintiff determines whether a suit falls under Section 7 (iv) (c) or Article 1, Schedule I of the Court Fees Act.

J.V.GUPTA, J.

1. The following question has, on a reference by me, sitting singly, come up for decision by this Full Bench.

"Where the plaintiff, who is a party to a document relating to the agricultural land, files a suit for its cancellation or for declaring it voidable against him, is such a suit governed by Sec. 7 (iv) (c) or article 1. Schedule I of the Court-fees Act?"

As the decision of this question will conclude both Civil Revision Petitions Nos. 1011 and 1012 of 1980, which have been referred on a common question of law, this judgment will dispose of both of them.

2. The brief facts, giving rise to this reference, are that the plaintiff-petitioner filed a suit for possession of agricultural land measuring 25 bighas and 6 biswas on the allegations that she was the owner thereof. She owned land and due to old age, she could not manage her property and, therefore, she appointed the father of the defendant-respondent, who is her nephew, as her general attorney vide deed D/- July 25, 1969, with a right to him to manage, sell or mortgage her property. The father of the defendant-respondent used to get various documents signed by her as she was dependent upon him. On account of this fiduciary relationship, Pavittar Singh got certain papers signed from her on the plea of their submission to the Income-tax authorities. In June, 1974, from the papers lying in her custody, it was found that they were sale deeds, one in favour of Pavittar Singh himself, and another in favour of the defendant, that is, his minor daughter. The plaintiff-petitioner never sold the land to the defendant-respondent, nor received any amount from her, nor she ever parted with the possession of the disputed property. Thus, a fraud was committed on her and consequently, the said sale deed was vitiated. It is further averred that the land revenue of the suit-land was Rs. 11/-, and for the purpose of jurisdiction, the suit was valued at Rs. 330/-. The Court-fee stamp fixed thereon was of Rs. 11/-. In the plaint, it has been prayed that the suit of the plaintiff-petitioner may be decreed with costs against the defendant-respondent and it be declared that the sale deed, dated March 12, 1970, got executed from her as a result of the fraud was void and not binding on her and that a decree for possession of the suit land be passed. Much to the same effect are the allegations in Civil Revision Petition No. 1012 of 1980, where the sale deed was by the plaintiff-petitioner in favour of Pavittar Singh, defendant respondent himself.

3. In the written statement, it was inter alia pleaded that the suit had not been properly valued for the purposes of the Court-fee and jurisdiction, and proper Court-fee had not been paid.

On January 9, 1978, the trial Court framed the following preliminary issue: "Whether the suit is not properly valued for purposes of Court-fee and jurisdiction? If so, its effect?"

The trial Court, after going through the plaint and the various judgments of this Court, came to the conclusion that the case fell within Article 1, Schedule 1 and not under Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court-fees Act (hereinafter called the Act), as claimed by the plaintiff-petitioner. Consequently, the suit was assessed for more than Rs. 50,000/-, being the sale consideration for the suit property. Feeling aggrieved against the same, the plaintiff-petitioner has filed this revision petition in this Court in which the present reference has been made.

4. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-petitioner contended that the suit was virtually for a declaration and the relief of possession was consequential thereto and was, therefore, covered under Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Act. In support of this contention, main reliance has been placed on Shamsher Singh V/s. Rajinder Prashad, AIR 1973 SC 2384, followed subsequently in Labh Singh V/s. Puran Singh, (1978) 80 Punj LR 29, and Mohan Singh V/s. Balbir Kaur, (1978) 80 Punj LR 622. The other judgments relied upon on behalf of th