1980 Supreme(P&H) 120
PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
S.P.Goyal, J.
Jagan Nath
Versus
Sangrur Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. Tappa, District Barnala
Civil Revision No. 931 of 1977,
Decided On : MARCH 31, 1980
The provisions of Section 11 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 come into play only when a building is actually let out, and not at any time prior thereto, including the point of time when the building is let out.
Headnote:
EAST PUNJAB URBAN RENT RESTRICTION ACT, 1949 - SECTION 11 - AMENDMENT OF PLEADINGS - NON-RESIDENTIAL BUILDING - USER OF BUILDING - INTERPRETATION OF STATUTE - Residential building let out for non-residential purpose - Whether remains residential building - Whether permission under Section 11 required for conversion - Whether provisions of Section 11 attracted only after building let out.
Fact of the Case:
Landlord sought ejectment of tenant from a residential building on the ground that he required the building for his son, who was a practicing lawyer. The tenant contested the ejectment, claiming that the building was a non-residential building and that he had been running his banking business there since the inception of the tenancy. The Rent Controller ordered ejectment, but the Appellate Authority set aside the order.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the tenant could not be prevented from taking a new and contradictory plea in the written statement filed to the amended petition, as there was no rule restricting the defendant to contest the plaintiff's claim to any particular pleas. The court also held that the building in dispute was a non-residential building, as the provisions of Section 11 of the Act came into play only when the building was actually let out and not at any time prior thereto.
Issues: 1. Whether the tenant could be permitted in law to take a new and contradictory plea in the written statement filed to the amended petition? 2. Whether the building in dispute being essentially a residential building could not be held to be non-residential because it has been let out or used for some time for a non-residential purpose?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court relied on the Division Bench judgment in Girdhari Lal v. Krishan Dutt, AIR 1960 Pb. 575, which held that there is no rule of law restricting the defendant to contest the plaintiff's claim to any particular pleas in an amended written statement. 2. The court interpreted Section 11 of the Act to mean that the provisions of the Act come into play only when a building is actually let out, and not at any time prior thereto, including the point of time when the building is let out.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the petition, holding that the tenant could not be prevented from taking a new and contradictory plea in the written statement filed to the amended petition, and that the building in dispute was a non-residential building.
S.P.Goyal, J.
1. This revision petition under Section 15 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 , (hereinafter referred to as the Act) has arisen out of the petition filed by Jagan Nath under Section 13 for ejectment of the respondent, with the allegations that the building in dispute is a residential house which was let out to the respondent in the year 1964 at a monthly rent of Rs. 50/- for a period of one year and that the respondent, after the expiry of the said period, is a statutory tenant. The ejectment was sought on the ground that the landlord required the said house for the use of his son who was a practising lawyer at Barnala and was married in the year 1968.
The application was contested by the respondent-Bank who admitted the tenancy, but controverted the averment that the landlord was in need of the building for occupation of his married son. After the evidence of the parties had been concluded, the respondent moved an application for the permission to amend the written statement so as to plead that the building in dispute was a non-residential building, but the same was rejected by the Rent Controller. On merits, the Rent Controller, upholding the plea of the landlord, passed the order for ejectment.
2. Aggrieved thereby, the respondent went in appeal before the learned Appellant Authority. Pending that appeal, the landlord moved an application for permission to amend his application so as to plead the necessary ingredients as required under Section 13(3) of the Act. The application was allowed vide order dated February 19, 1976 and after filing of the amended application, the tenant was called upon to file his reply. In this written statement, apart from reiterating the earlier pleas, the tenant pleaded that the building in dispute was a non-residential building in which the tenant Bank was running its banking business from the very inception of the tenancy. The landlord filed the replication to the written statement to plead that the demised premises were constructed to be used as residential building and it was given to the tenant for the same purpose. It was further pleaded that the tenant has changed the user without the consent of the landlord and was, therefore, liable to eviction on this ground also. In view of the amended pleadings, the Appellate Authority framed three additional issues two of which are only relevant for the purpose of this petition and read as under :-
1. Whether the premises in suit are non-residential building and if so, to what effect ?
2. Whether the appellant has changed the user of the premises and as such is liable to ejectment ?
After getting report from the Rent Controller both the issues were decided against the landlord and the order of ejectment set aside vide judgment dated March 22, 1977.
3 The legality of the impugned judgment has been challenged by the learned counsel for the petitioner on two grounds, namely that the tenant could not be permitted in law to take a new and contradictory plea in the written statement filed to the amended petition and that the building in dispute being essentially a residential building could not be held to be non-residential because it has been let out or used for some time for a non-residential purpose.
4. To elaborate his first ground, the learned counsel argued that when the petitioner is allowed to make amendment in the petition, the respondent would have right to reply only with respect to the matters introduced by the amendment and no further. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on Thakkar Babulal Dayashanker v. Mehta Natwar Lal Kuluram and anr. AIR 1978 Gujarat 94 and Mittar Sain and others v. Ram Dass and anr. 1978 PLR 145. So far as Mittar Sains (supra) is concerned it is a single Bench decision of this court by S. C. Mital, J. who in revision set aside the order of the trial court and directed that the amendment of the written statement of the (sic) confined to matters introduced by th