The court held that a decree for an injunction could be enforced by putting the judgment-debtors in civil prison under Order 21 Rule 32(1) of the Code.

1. Whether the decree-holder gave the possession of the land to the judgement debtors, as alleged ?

2. Relief.

Both the parties were allowed to lead evidence in support of their stand and the executing Court after going through the record, came to the conclusion that the judgement-debtors took the possession forcibly from the decree-holder. The allegation of the judgement-debtors that they had agreed to forego their amount from Bagicha Singh and in turn the latter had handed over the possession of the suit land to them voluntarily, was found to be false. While granting the relief, it was objected on behalf of the judgement-debtors that the decree cannot be enforced by putting them in civil prison. In support of this argument, reliance was placed upon the provisions of Sections 51 and 58 of the Code. It was urged that Section 58 dues not relate to the execution of the injunction decree, and therefore, no order for detention could be passed against the judgement-debtors. The executing Court did not accept this contention of the judgement-debtors and passed the impugned order under Order 21 Rule 32(1) of the Code.

3. The learned counsel for the judgement-debtors has vehemently argued that the finding of the executing Court that they had taken the possession forcibly, is wrong and illegal, particularly in view of the acquittal order passed by the Criminal Court in their favour on 22nd November, 1974. It was also contended that the decree-holder is estopped to execute the decree because he himself allowed his earlier application to be consigned to the record room and to wait for the decision of the Criminal Court. According to the learned counsel the proper remedy for the decree-holder to get the possession back is to file a regular civil suit. It was also urged that the application for execution of the decree is barred by limitation because of Article 135 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 . I have considered all these contentions of the learned counsel, but I do not find any force in either of them. These pleas were never taken in the reply filed by them in the executing Court; nor the executing Court was ever called upon to decide this matter on the said pleas. The only question before the executing Court was, whether the possession was delivered by the decree-holder voluntarily as alleged by the judgement-debtors in their reply or it was taken forcibly by them. This being a finding of fact arrived at after considering the evidence on record, this Court will not interfere with the same in its revisional jurisdiction. As regards the question of limitation based on Art.135, I do not find any force therein. That article is applicable only for the enforcement of a decree granting a mandatory injunction whereas in the present case, the decree is for prohibitory injunction.

4. The learned counsel for the judgement-debtors next contended that in any case, no order of detention under O.21 R.32(1) of the Code could be passed by the executing Court. His argument is that under Section 51(c) of the a Code, the Court may order execution of the decree by arrest and detention in prison for such period not exceeding the period specified in Section 58, where arrest and detention is permissible under that Section. Section 58 provides that :

"(1) Every person detained in the civil prison in execution of a decree shall be so detained :-

(a) where the decree is for the payment of a sum of money exceeding one thousand rupees, for a period not exceeding three months, and

(b) where the decree is for the payment of a sum of money exceeding five hundred rupees, but not exceeding the one thousand rupees, for a period not exceeding six weeks : Provided that he shall be released from such detention before the expiration of the said period of detention - (i) on the amount mentioned in the warrant for his detention being paid to the officer in charge of the civil prison, or

(ii) on the decree against him being otherwise fully satisfied, or

(iii) on th