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1979 Supreme(P&H) 134

PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
Prem Chand Jain and D.S.Tewatia JJ.
Ibrahim
Versus
Sharifan
Letter Patent Appeal No. 383 of 1975,
Decided On : AUGUST 10, 1979

Mere entry of a mutation in the name of the defendant does not furnish a cause of action to the plaintiff to file a suit for declaration.

Headnote:

LIMITATION ACT, 1963 - ART. 58 - SUIT FOR DECLARATION - CAUSE OF ACTION - MERE ENTRY OF MUTATION IN THE NAME OF THE DEFENDANT DOES NOT FURNISH A CAUSE OF ACTION TO THE PLAINTIFF TO FILE A SUIT FOR DECLARATION.

Fact of the Case:

Plaintiff and defendant were siblings who inherited land from their father and uncle. After the father's death, the mutation of inheritance was sanctioned in favor of the plaintiff, defendant, and their mother in equal shares. After the mother's death, the mutation of her inheritance was sanctioned in favor of the plaintiff and defendant in equal shares. After the uncle's death, the mutation of his inheritance was again sanctioned in favor of the plaintiff and defendant in equal shares. The defendant started living in another village a few years before the suit was filed. The plaintiff claimed exclusive possession of the land and filed a suit for declaration claiming himself to be the sole owner. The trial court dismissed the suit as barred by limitation. The first appellate court reversed the finding on limitation and granted a declaration in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant appealed to the High Court.

Finding of the Court:

The High Court held that the mere entry of a mutation in the name of the defendant did not furnish a cause of action to the plaintiff to file a suit for declaration. The plaintiff continued to be in possession of the entire property even after the sanction of the mutations in the name of the defendant. The defendant was never given any share in the rent or produce from the land. The defendant never asserted her right to her share in the land or interfered with the plaintiff's possession until 1969. Therefore, the suit was within limitation.

Issues: Whether the mere entry of a mutation in the name of the defendant furnished a cause of action to the plaintiff to file a suit for declaration.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the mere entry of a mutation in the name of the defendant did not furnish a cause of action to the plaintiff to file a suit for declaration. The plaintiff continued to be in possession of the entire property even after the sanction of the mutations in the name of the defendant. The defendant was never given any share in the rent or produce from the land. The defendant never asserted her right to her share in the land or interfered with the plaintiff's possession until 1969. Therefore, the suit was within limitation.

Final Decision: The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the learned single Judge, and restored that of the first appellate Court decreeing the suit of the plaintiff.

Judgment

1. Ibrahim, plaintiff-appellant is the brother of Smt. Sharifan alias Shanti, defendant-respondent. Their father Akbar and uncle Bhiku were occupancy tenants. After the coming into force of the Occupancy. Tenants (Vesting of Proprietary Rights) Act, they became owners of the land in dispute. During the year 1947, when communal disturbances broke out, Akbar and other members of the family adopted Hindu names so that they could remain safe during the disturbances. Akbar died in the year 1957 and the mutation of inheritance was sanctioned treating the parties as Hindus in favour of the plaintiff, the defendant and their mother Nanhi in equal shares. Smt. Nanhi died in the year 1966 and the mutation of her inheritance was sanctioned in favour of the plaintiff and the defendant in equal shares. On the death of Bhiku, the uncle of the parties, the mutation of his inheritance was again sanctioned in favour of the plaintiff and the defendant in equal shares. The defendant had started living in village Kambohpura a few years earlier to the institution of the suit. The plaintiff claims himself to be in exclusive possession of the land inherited from Akbar and Bhiku, including the share which was mutated in the name of the defendant. In the year 1969, the defendant threatened to take forcible possession of her share, with the result that the plaintiff filed a suit for declaration claiming himself to be the sole owner of the property measuring 48 Kanals 2 Marlas as mentioned in the plaint.

2. The suit was contested by the defendant on various pleas. On the pleadings of the parties, several issues were framed by the trial Court. The parties led evidence on those issues. The trial Court held that the parties were Muslims and were governed by custom in the matter of succession and that the plaintiff was entitled to the declaration prayed for. On the issue of limitation, the trial Court held that the suit was barred by limitation. Consequently; the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed. Feeling aggrieved from the judgement and decree of the trial Court the plaintiff preferred an appeal which was heard by the learned Senior Subordinate Judge, Karnal, with enhanced appellate powers, who upheld the findings of the trial Court on issues Nos. 1 and 2 but reversed the finding on issue No. 4. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the judgement and decree of the trial Court was set aside and a declaration as prayed for was granted in favour of the plaintiff. Feeling dissatisfied from the judgement and decree of the first appellate Court, the defendant preferred R.S.A. No. 1803 of 1972 in this Court. The learned Single Judge did not agree with the finding of the first appellate Court and held that the suit was barred by limitation. Consequently, the appeal of the defendant was allowed and the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed with costs throughout. Aggrieved from the judgement and decree of the learned Single Judge dated May 21, 1975, the present appeal under cl.X of the Letters Patent has been filed by the plaintiff.

3. At the outset, it may be observed that though before the learned single Judge a controversy did arise as to which Article out of Arts.113 and 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) would apply to the facts of the case in hand, yet before us it was agreed to between the learned counsel for the parties that it was Art.58 which would govern the present case.

4. On the issue of limitation, the learned single Judge held that the word first occurring in Art.58 has great significance; that the word first could not be construed in any other manner except that the limitation in a declaratory suit shall begin to run when the cause to sue for the property first accrues to the plaintiff; that it was in the year 1959 that a cloud was cast on the right of the plaintiff to succeed to the entire land in dispute and that the period of limitation began to run from the year 1957 and not afterwards.

5. The learned Jud





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