An order of suspension or reinstatement of a Panch under section 102(1) of the Gram Panchayat Act is a quasi-judicial order and must be passed in accordance with the principles of natural justice.

K.S.Tiwana, J.

1. Suresh Chand, Dhan Singh and Shrimati Janki Devi petitioners, residents of village Pipli Khera, Tehsil and District Sonepat, filed this petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India against the Director of Panchayats, Haryana, Ved Parkash Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, Pipli Khera and Shrimati Dhapo of the same village, respondents No. 1, 2 and 3 respectively, challenging the reinstatement of respondent No. 2 and the co-option of respondent No. 3 as a member of the Panchayat.

2. The case set up by the petitioners is that Ved Parkash respondent No. 2, was the Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat of village Pipli Khera in the previous term. A case under sections 406 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code, vide first information report No. 59 dated 13th of February, 1973 was registered at Police Station, Sonepat, against respondent No. 2. Petitioner No. 2 moved an application to the respondent No. 1 to the effect that respondent No. 2 was involved in a case under section 406/420, Indian Penal Code, involving moral turpitude and as such it would embarrass him in the discharge of his duties as a Sarpanch. In that application, a prayer for the suspension of respondent No. 2 was made. Respondent No. 1 accepting that prayer responded ruspondent No. 2 under section 102(1) of the Gram Panchayat Act, 1952, hereinafter referred as the Act, vide orders (Annexure P.1) dated 6th of January, 1976, holding that the offence was likely to embarass him in the discharge of his duties and involved moral turpitude. By virtue of the suspension orders, respondent No. 2 was debarred from taking part in any act or proceedings of the Panchayat of village Pipli Khera. During the continuance of the suspension, Panchayat elections were held in June, 1978, and respondent No. 2 was again elected as Sarpanch. Petitioner No. 1, who is an elected member of the Panchayat, after the new election, moved an application against respondent No. 2, for his suspension before respondent No. 1 on the same grounds. Again, vide orders (Annexure P.2) dated 30th of June, 1978, Respondent No. 1 suspended respondent No. 2 from the office of the Sarpanch and Panch on the ground that this offence is likely to embarrass him in the discharge of his duties and involves moral turpitude and debarred him from taking part in any act or proceedings of the Panchayat of village Pipli Khere during the period of suspension. Vide orders (Annexure P.3) dated 18th of July, 1978, respondent No. 1 reinstated respondent No. 2 as Sarpanch of village Pipli Khera holding that the criminal case registered against respondent No. 2 is not likely to embarrass him in the discharge of his duties as a Sarpanch. The petitioners allege that respondent No. 2, who is an influential man, moved an application before the Chief Minister of Haryana on 17th of July, 1978 and because of his influence managed to get the orders of his reinstatement passed. The orders were obtained with a view to co-opt respondent No. 3 as a member of the Gram Panchayat. The order of reinstatement has been challenged on the ground that it is a non-speaking order passed in a mala fide manner to facilitate the co-option of respondent No. 3, without notice to the complainants and without application of mind on the part of respondent No. 1.

3. The order of reinstatment was defendant on behalf of respondent No.1, the Director of Panchayats, on the ground that it was not passed at the instance of anybody but on hearing of respondent No. 2.

4. Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 in their written statements raised preliminary objections that in the face of alternative remedy by way of revision under section 100(2) of the Gram Panchayat Act available, the petition was not competent and that there was no substantial injury to the petitioners nor was there any failure of justice. The suspension and reinstatement were not disputed and the act of mala fide as alleged was denied.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioners did not press th