1970 Supreme(P&H) 157

PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
H.R.Sodhi and Bal Raj Tuli JJ.
Bakhtawar Singh
Versus
State Of Punjab
of,
Civil Writ No. 1042 of 1969,
Decided On : OCTOBER 6, 1970

The provisions of Sec.10 (1) (e) (iv) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 were intra vires the Constitution and valid.

Headnote:

The petitioner was appointed as a whole-time member of the Punjab State Electricity Board under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. The State Government, in exercise of its powers under Sec.10 of the Act, removed the petitioner from the office of whole-time Member of the Board. The petitioner challenged the order of removal on the ground that the impugned order was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice, the provisions of the Act were ultra vires the Constitution, and the order was not a speaking order. The court held that the provisions of Sec.10 (1) (e) (iv) of the Act were intra vires the Constitution and valid. The court further held that the petitioner had no right to claim that a full-fledged regular enquiry should have been held against him by appointing an enquiry officer. The court also held that the impugned order was not a speaking order and quashed the same.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner was appointed as a whole-time member of the Punjab State Electricity Board under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. The State Government, in exercise of its powers under Sec.10 of the Act, removed the petitioner from the office of whole-time Member of the Board. The petitioner challenged the order of removal on the ground that the impugned order was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice, the provisions of the Act were ultra vires the Constitution, and the order was not a speaking order.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the provisions of Sec.10 (1) (e) (iv) of the Act were intra vires the Constitution and valid. The court further held that the petitioner had no right to claim that a full-fledged regular enquiry should have been held against him by appointing an enquiry officer. The court also held that the impugned order was not a speaking order and quashed the same.

Issues: 1. Whether the provisions of Sec.10 (1) (e) (iv) of the Act were ultra vires the Constitution? 2. Whether the petitioner had a right to claim that a full-fledged regular enquiry should have been held against him by appointing an enquiry officer? 3. Whether the impugned order was a speaking order?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the provisions of Sec.10 (1) (e) (iv) of the Act were intra vires the Constitution and valid. The court observed that the Act provides for the rationalisation of production and distribution of electricity in order to bring about electrical development in the welfare State. The object is that the benefits of electricity are extended to urban, rural and suburban areas, though a system of administration controlled by the Board constituted under Sec.5 of the Act. The Board has been made into a body corporate and is to have amongst its members persons who have experience of commercial enterprises and administration and also possess technical qualifications. Sec.8 provides that the Chairman and members of the Board are to hold office for such period and on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed by the Rules. According to the Rules, the term of office of a member shall be for such period not exceeding five years as may be fixed by the Government which is also to decide about the remuneration. Sec.9 enjoins that a member so long as he holds office shall not have any interest, direct or indirect, in any firm or company carrying on the business of generation, transmission, distribution, or use of electricity, or concerned with the manufacture, sale or hire of machinery apparatus, plan or equipment which could be connected with such generation, transmission, distribution or use. If prior to his appointment, a member had any such interst, he must inform the Government about it before taking charge of his office and divest himself of the same. He is required to remain quite aloof from political life of the country and if he even seeks to become a member of the Parliament, or the State Legislature or any local body, he renders himself liable to removal from office. Sec.10 lays down the conditions and circumstances under which he can be removed or suspended from office and the prohibition from entering public life is to be found in Clause (d) sub-section (1) thereof. The court further observed that Clause (iv) of sub-section (1) (e) of the above section that is sought to be declared ultra vires Art.14 of the Constitution. The attack is directed on the ground that the power given to the State Government in the matter of removal of a member is arbitrary, uncontrolled and unchannelised, admitting of discriminatory classification of natural justice. The court held that the policy of the Act in inserting Clause (iv) of Sec.10 (1) (e) and the guiding principles for the exercise of discretion are easily discernible and one can find a clear clue as to the circumstances in which the discretion should be exercised by the State Government in regard to the removal of a member of the Board on the ground of his being unfit for the office. The court further held that the presumption of law is in favour of constitutionality of the provision and Mr. Kaushal has not been able to show, beyond vehemently stressing that the discretion was capable of abuse, how any unreasonable classification was created. The test of unfitness is to be found in each case on an objective data having some nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the Act. Moreover, the power is vested in no less an authority than the State Government and it cannot be assumed that discretion will in every cases be exercised arbitrarily or capriciously. 2. The court held that the petitioner had no right to claim that a full-fledged regular enquiry should have been held against him by appointing an enquiry officer. The court observed that the Act does not permit the exercise of discretion in an arbitrary manner inasmuch as it is obligatory on the State the delinquent member to explain the charges against him before any action by way of suspension or removal from office can be taken against him. The statutory provision requiring explanation to be obtained is by itself a great check on the exercise of discretion and an order passed after consideration of the explanation is intended by law to be based on an objective data. Sec.10 (1) (e) (iv) of the act is intra vires of the Constitution and valid. It has to be seen on the facts and circumstances of each case where an individual order is discriminatory or mala fide passed by an abuse of power vested in the competent authority. 3. The court held that the impugned order was not a speaking order and quashed the same. The court observed that a perusal of the statement of allegations as given above, makes it abundantly clear that all necessary particulars were supplied to the petitioner pinning down even the point of time when the petitioner was said to have contacted certain M. L. As of the Akali Party to press them to join Janta Party or he took any other step in this regard. The argument that mere mentioning that a few days after the formation of the Janta Partys ministry the petitioner went to a certain village and contacted Shri Hardit Singh is not sufficient and that a date should have been specified is devoid of force. Formation of Janta Party was on a specified date and it cannot be believed that the petitioner did not know of it. The expression "a few days" has also a very clear understandable import and no vagueness appears in this allegation. In the second allegation too, the same criticism was levelled by Mr. Kaushal and is equally without substance. He could not find fault with other allegations which give even the dates on which the petitioner was alleged to have committed supposed indiscreet and ill-advised acts of dabbling in politics as a member of the Board. The court further observed that the impugned order has, therefore, to be quashed on the short ground that it offended against the rules of natural justice inasmuch as the material not made available to the petitioner was used against him and he was not afforded an opportunity to explain two of the allegations.

Final Decision: The petition was allowed, removal of the petitioner from membership of the Board declared illegal and a writ of certiorari directed to issue quashing the impugned order of the Governor of Punjab as passed on 25th April, 1969. There was no order as to costs.