PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
R.S.Narula, J.
Boota Singh
Versus
Roshan Lal
of,
Civil Revn. No. 416 of 1969,
Decided On : AUGUST 7, 1970
EAST PUNJAB URBAN RENT RESTRICTION ACT - SECTION 15(5) - REVISION PETITION - AMENDMENT OF PLEADING - JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE AUTHORITY - WAIVER OF OBJECTION - NOTICE UNDER SECTION 106 OF THE TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT - INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL PROVISIONS - BONA FIDES OF PARTY SEEKING AMENDMENT - RE-OPENING OF CASE ON FACTUAL ASPECTS - ALLOWANCE OF AMENDMENT AT APPELLATE STAGE - CONDITIONS - COSTS OF REVISION PETITION.
Fact of the Case:
The landlord filed an application for eviction against the tenants on the ground of unauthorized subletting. The tenants contested the proceedings but did not raise the objection of non-service of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act in their written statement. The Rent Controller ordered eviction from the entire premises. The tenants appealed and applied for leave to amend their written statement to raise the objection of non-service of notice. The Appellate Authority allowed the amendment, holding that waiver is a deliberate and conscious act and that the tenants had not waived the objection. The landlord filed a revision petition challenging the order of the Appellate Authority.
Finding of the Court:
The High Court held that the Appellate Authority had jurisdiction to allow the amendment of the written statement as the provisions of Order 6, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure had not been made applicable to proceedings under the Act and the Appellate Authority had the widest amplitude of jurisdiction under Section 15(3) of the Act. However, the High Court held that the tenants had waived the objection of non-service of notice by not raising it in their written statement and that the Appellate Authority had erred in allowing the amendment. The High Court allowed the revision petition, set aside the orders of the Appellate Authority, and directed the Appellate Authority to dispose of the appeal on merits without unnecessary delay.
Issues: 1. Whether the Appellate Authority had jurisdiction to allow the amendment of the written statement? 2. Whether the tenants had waived the objection of non-service of notice by not raising it in their written statement? 3. Whether the Appellate Authority erred in allowing the amendment?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Appellate Authority had jurisdiction to allow the amendment of the written statement as the provisions of Order 6, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure had not been made applicable to proceedings under the Act and the Appellate Authority had the widest amplitude of jurisdiction under Section 15(3) of the Act. 2. The tenants had waived the objection of non-service of notice by not raising it in their written statement. 3. The Appellate Authority erred in allowing the amendment as the tenants had waived the objection and there were no strong justifications for allowing the amendment at the appellate stage after the expiry of more than 21½ years.
Final Decision: The High Court allowed the revision petition, set aside the orders of the Appellate Authority, and directed the Appellate Authority to dispose of the appeal on merits without unnecessary delay.
1. This is a petition under sub-section (5) of S.15 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restrict Act (3 of 1949) (hereinafter called the Act) against the order of Shri Ved Parkash Sharma, Appellate Authority, Faridkot dated March, 3, 1969 setting aside the order of the Rent Controller after allowing the present respondents leave to amend their original written statement so as to take up a new plea to the effect that no notice terminating their tenancy having been served on them under Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act, the application of the petitioners was liable to be dismissed.
2. Mr. Bhagat Singh Chawla, the learned counsel for the respondents, has raised a preliminary objection to the effect that no petition for revision of an order of the rent control authorities allowing an amendment of a pleading under Order 6, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure lies to this Court as such an order is not "an order passed under this Act" within the meaning of that expression used in Sec.16 (5) of the Act. Sub-section (5) of S.15 is in the following terms:" the High Court may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party or on its own motion, call for and examine the records relating to any other passed or proceedings taken under this Act for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such order or proceedings and may pass such order in relation thereto as it may deem fit. " Mr. Chawla has not been able to cite any authority in support of the proposition canvassed by him. The phraseology of section 15 (5) leaves no doubt in my mind that it is the legality or proprietary of only such an order as that can be questioned in a petition under the Act that can be questioned in a petition under that provision. But the real question to be answered, in order to decide this preliminary objection, is whether an order passed under any particular provision of the Code of Civil Procedure which applies to the rent control proceedings, in the course of such proceedings, can or cannot be said to be an order of proceedings under the Act. It is not only an order passed under the Act, in respect of which the High Court is entitled to satisfy itself (about its legality or propriety) in exercise of its revisional powers. "proceedings" under the Act would, in my opinion, include a part of any proceedings under the Act. An appeal preferred against the order of a Rent Controller and all orders passed by the Appellate authority during the course of the hearing, and adjudication of that appeal would be "proceedings taken under the Act" within the meaning of Sec.15 (5) of the Act. The order sought to be revised in this case was passed in this courts of proceedings of the appeal before the Appellate Authority and related directly to the proceedings under the Act, Pleadings of the parties are an important part of the proceedings under the Act, and an order of the Appellate Authority allowing amendment of the same would, in my opinion, be a part of the proceedings under section 15 (3) of the Act. Even otherwise, this Court is entitled in exercise of its jurisdiction under Art.227 of the Constitution to set aside any order passed by a Subordinate Court or Tribunal within its jurisdiction if the order is found to be wholly unsustainable. The first preliminary objection of MR. Chawla is therefore, repelled.
3. The second objection of a preliminary nature raised by Mr. Chawla is to the effect that no revision should be entertained or allowed against an order allowing an amendment on the analogy of the law laid down in this respect in Bal Kishan Das V/s. Om Parkash C. R. No.1091 of 1966, decided on 23-10-1968 (Punj), Baldev Singh V/s. Kapoori Lal, C. R. No.308 of 1969, decided on 28-8-1969 (Punj), Ajit Singh V/s. Uttam Singh, C. R. No.677 of 1968, decided on 1-9-1969 (Punj) and Krishnan Lal V/s. Smt. Tara Wanti, C. R. No.942 of 1968, decided on 1-9-1969 (Punj ). It is claimed that all these decisions were based on certain observ
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