A general search warrant under Section 96(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot be issued for investigation and the Magistrate must apply his judicial mind and be satisfied about the necessity of issuing the search warrants.

Gurdev Singh, J.

1. In the course of the investigation of a case registered under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption at Police Division No. 5, Ludhiana, against Shri P.C. Behl, a former District Magistrate of Ludhiana, the investigating officer approached Shri M.S. Lubana, Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Ludhiana, for general search warrants under Section 96(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the petitioner Major Avtar Singh and others. The learned Magistrate readily accepted to the request and issued warrants authorizing Shri Om Parkash Sharma, Superintendent of Police, Special Inquiry Agency (Vigilance), Punjab (respondent No. 2) to search the house of Major Avtar Singh, petitioner, Mit Singh, Dewan Chand Behl and Piare Lal and P.C. Behl and "to seize documents that may incriminate Shri P.C. Behl and further the investigation of the case."

2. Feeling aggrieved by the issue of these warrants, Major Avtar Singh has approached this Court under Section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code to quash the search warrants issued against him. The various grounds on which the validity of the search warrants has been assailed are :-

(1) that since the Judicial Magistrate was not competent to try the offence under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act in connection with the investigation of which the warrants were issued, he was not competent to order the search;

(2) that a general search warrant under Section 96(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code could be issued by a Court only for the purpose of enquiry or trial or other proceedings and not in connection with the investigation of a case;

(3) that there was no material before the Magistrate to justify the issue of a search warrant, and since he did not apply his mind to the facts of the case, the warrants were illegal; and

(4) that the prayer for issuing the warrants was mala fide and made with a view to harass the petitioner, there being no reasonable ground for any search of his house.

3. The records summoned from the Magistrate disclose that at the time the Magistrate accepted the prayer of the investigating officer to issue the general search warrant against the petitioner and others, he had before him merely a copy of the first information report containing the allegation that it was reliably learnt that in the course of his employment with the Government Shri P.C. Behl had acquired assets disproportionate to his known source of income in his own name and in the name of his wife and sons. No other material was placed before the Magistrate and before issuing the impugned warrants he did not even examine the investigating officer to satisfy himself that the petitioner was in possession of any documents connected with the crime or that it was necessary to order the general search of his house. He did not even try to find out how the petitioner was connected with Shri P.C. Behl against whom the first information report had been lodged and ordered the general search of the petitioners house on the ground that "for the effectual investigation of the case registered against Shri P.C. Behl, it is necessary to issue general search warrants to seize documents incriminating Mr. Behl."

4. The petitioners contention that general search warrants under Section 96(1)(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot be issued to help the investigation, finds support from K. Hoshide and another v. Emperor, AIR 1940 Cal. 97 wherein a Division Bench of that Court ruled that part (3) of Section 96(1) does not empower the Magistrate issuing warrants to help investigation by the police. In coming to this conclusion, the learned Judges pointed out that the word "investigation", which occurs in Section 94 of the Criminal Procedure Code empowering a Court to issue summons for production of documents, it omitted from part (3) of Section 96(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Relying upon this omission Sen, J. observed :-

"It is clear, therefore, from the omission of the word "inve