A civil court cannot grant an interim injunction in a suit for declaration simpliciter without a prayer for permanent injunction, and the order of the Executive Magistrate under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code is prima facie evidence of possession.

Gurdev Singh, J.

1. The petitioners Surja and others are defendants in a suit brought by the respondents Gopi Nath and others seeking declaration that they were co-sharers in possession of 194 bighas 19 biswas of the land in dispute situate in village Rana Majra, and the order of the Executive Magistrate, dated 15th May, 1967, made under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code declaring the defendants-petitioners to be in possession of that property on 1st August, 1963, was ineffectual qua them. In the initial stages of the suit, an application for temporary injunction restraining the present petitioners from interfering with the plaintiffs possession of the disputed land was made. It was asserted that the plaintiffs had been in possession of the land throughout, and the finding of the Executive Magistrate that the opposite party was in possession on 1st August, 1963, was wrong, and they had no right to disturb the plaintiffs possession. The learned Subordinate Judge accepted this plea and granted a temporary injunction by his order dated 10th March, 1969, holding that prima facie the plaintiffs were in possession of the suit property. This finding was based on Naqsha Jim i.e., file of Burdi Bramdgi, prepared in 1966. In granting the interim injunction, the learned Subordinate Judge observed :-

"The entries in this naqsha Jeem, to which presumption of the truth is attached under the law, clearly supported the plea of the plaintiff. In view of the entries in the revenue record, I feel inclined to accept the case of the plaintiffs, and it is held that prima facie they are in cultivating possession of the suit-land. In the result, this application is hereby, without prejudice to the merits of the case, accepted and the contesting defendants are restrained from interfering with the plaintiffs possession over the suit-land till further orders to the contrary."

2. In confirming this order, the learned Additional District Judge, to whom the appeal was taken by the contesting defendants, again mainly relied upon this Naqsha Jim and treated it as a prima facie evidence of the plaintiffs possession. The final order passed by the Executive Magistrate under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code on 15th May, 1967, whereby it was held that the defendants (petitioners) were in possession of the land in suit on 1st August, 1963, was brushed aside by him merely observing.

"There is nothing at this stage to show that after the attachment was effected in proceedings under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the defendants had obtained possession, and rather the learned counsel for the plaintiffs referred me to the copy of the Naqspa Jim prepared in the partition proceedings showing that they were in possession of the suit-land, and my attention was also drawn to the copy of the latest Girdawari to indicate that the possession was with the plaintiffs now."

3. Mr. R.S. Mittal, arguing the case on behalf of the petitioners, has, besides contending that the respondents were never in possession of the land in dispute, urged that the learned Subordinate Jude had no jurisdiction to grant the interim injunction prayed for because (1) the case was not covered by either rule 1 or Rule 2 of Order 39 of the Civil Procedure Code as the suit was for declaration simpliciter without there being any prayer for permanent injunction, (2) the Courts had committed a legal error in observing that Naqsha Jim, which their finding with regard to possession proceeds carried presumption of truth, and (3) the final order of the Executive Magistrate passed under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code was prima facie evidence of the petitioners possession, and the plaintiffs could not be permitted to urge that they were in possession of the property on 1st August, 1963, or had continued to be in possession till the date of the suit without there being any entry that the petitioners having been dispossessed.

4. The property in dispute was admittedl