Ignorance of law on the part of a counsel is not a sufficient cause for extending the limitation period under Section 5 of the Limitation Act unless the mistake was such that it could not have been discovered by taking reasonable care and due diligence.

P.C.Pandit, J.

1. This order will dispose of application (C.M. 822-C of 1966) under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act filed by the appellant Jai Ram Dass in R.F.A. 143 of 1966. The Regular First Appeal was filed in this Court on 8th of March 1966, but the appellant had not attached with it a receipt for a sum of Rs. 100/- which, according to Rule 9 in Chapter 2-A of High Court Rules and Orders Volume V, had to be deposited with the Treasurer of this Court to cover the cost of printing the record. The last date for filing this appeal was admittedly 16th March, 1966. The office pointed out this mistake to the counsel and returned the appeal to him on 10th of March, 1966 for being refiled within a week. The said amount of the advance printing fee was, however, deposited in this Court on 21st of March 1966, when the appeal was re filed. On this date, an application under Section 5 of the limitation Act was also made for condoning the delay in filing the appeal within limitation. It is this application which is being disposed of by this order.

2. According to the affidavit of the counsel for the appellant, he wrote a letter to the appellant on the 11th of March 1966 regarding the deposit of Rs. 100 as required by the office. The client contacted the counsel on Sunday the 20th March, 1966 and handed over the amount of Rs. 100/- to him. The said amount was then deposited in this Court on 21st of March 1966. His case was that this was the first Regular First Appeal which he had filed in this Court and he had to quote his own words, "skipped over to deposit Rs. 100/- as advance printing fee." The mistake on his part, according to him, was not intentional but was by over sight. The appellant had also filed his affidavit, according to which he had received the letter of his counsel on 18th of March, 1966 as he was out of Patiala for five days and had reached there on that very date. According to him, the counsel had asked him to contact him on Saturday the 19th of March, 1966 in the district Court, Patiala, regarding the payment of this amount of Rs. 100/-. The said amount, according to the appellant, had been handed over to the counsel on 19th of March, 1966. On these facts, the question for decision is whether the appellant can have the benefit of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, according to which an appeal can be admitted after the period of limitation, if the appellant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal with such period.

3. The case of the appellant was that his counsel was a junior one and had recently started practice in this Court. As a matter of fact this was the first Regular First Appeal that he had filed and he was not aware of Rule 9 according to which the advance printing fee of Rs. 100/- had to be deposited along with the filing of the appeal. The moment he came to know of this defect, he wrote to the client and deposited this amount the very next day when it was handed over to him. Under these circumstances it was a bona fide mistake on his part which he rectified quickly and the appellant was thus entitled to have the benefit of Section 5 of the limitation Act. It was also argued by the learned counsel that Rule 9 was directly and not mandatory in nature and its non-compliance could not result in the dismissal of the appeal.

4. It is true, as held by the Privy Counsel in Kunwar Rajendra Bahadur Singh v. Raj Raeshwar Bali and others, AIR 1937 Privy Counsel 276, that a mistaken advice given by a legal practitioner may, in the circumstances of a particular case, give rise to sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act though there was certainly no general doctrine which saved parties from the results of wrong advice. It may also be correct that in certain cases ignorance of law on the part of a counsel can be a ground for extending the period of limitation under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. But the appellant in the instant case ca