SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Article Pause Article
judgment-img

1966 Supreme(P&H) 177

PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
Mehar Singh and D.K.Mahajan JJ.
Kishore Chand
Versus
Dharam Pal
Second Appeal No. 2 of 1965,
Decided On : AUGUST 25, 1966

The term of a lease for purposes of registration is the period for which the lessee is protected against dispossession at the will and pleasure of a lessor, or, in other words, the length of time for which the lessee is entitled to continue in possession provided he himself fulfils all the stipulated conditions.

Headnote:

REGISTRATION ACT - LEASE - TERM EXCEEDING ONE YEAR - RENT-NOTE - ADMISSIBILITY IN EVIDENCE - CONDITIONS OF LEASE - PROTECTION AGAINST DISPOSSESSION - INTERPRETATION.

Fact of the Case:

The appellant took on lease a part of a house at Amritsar, executing a rent-note in favor of the respondent. The rent-note provided that the appellant would pay rent month by month, and if rent was paid continuously, he would not be liable to ejectment. The respondent instituted a suit for ejectment of the appellant on the ground of having served notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, terminating the tenancy. The appellant defended that the tenancy is to continue till he continues to pay the rent.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the rent-note created a lease for a term exceeding one year and was compulsorily registrable under Section 17 (1) (d) of the Indian Registration Act, 1908. The court found that the appellant had protection against dispossession at the will and pleasure of the respondent provided he fulfilled all the conditions stated in the rent-note, and merely because for breach of one of the conditions he may have made himself liable to ejectment, that does not alter the nature of the duration of the tenancy as one not being for a term exceeding one year.

Issues: Whether the rent-note, Exhibit P-1, is a lease for a term exceeding one year within the meaning and scope of Clause (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (Act 16 of 1908)?

Ratio Decidendi: The court interpreted the term of a lease for purposes of registration as the period for which the lessee is protected against dispossession at the will and pleasure of a lessor, or, in other words, the length of time for which the lessee is entitled to continue in possession provided he himself fulfils all the stipulated conditions. The court found that the appellant had protection against dispossession at the will and pleasure of the respondent provided he fulfilled all the conditions stated in the rent-note, and merely because for breach of one of the conditions he may have made himself liable to ejectment, that does not alter the nature of the duration of the tenancy as one not being for a term exceeding one year.

Final Decision: The court answered the question in the affirmative, holding that the rent-note was a lease for a term exceeding one year and was compulsorily registrable under Section 17 (1) (d) of the Indian Registration Act, 1908.

Judgment

1. The only question for considers tion in this reference by my learned brother, Mahajan, J., is whether the rent-note, Ex. P-1, of June 11, 1961, executed by Kishore Chand, appellant, in favour of Dharam Pal, respondent, taking on lease a part of a house at Amrit-sar, creates a lease for any term exceeding one year within the meaning and scope of Clause (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (Act 16 of 1908)?

2. The appellant took on lease the demised premises at a rental of Rs. 10 per men-sam, executing the rent-note, which, therefore, is a written document as executed by him. This is, for the present purpose, the material portion of the rent-note:

". . . . will pay rent month by month; if rant is paid continuously, then 1 will not be liable to ejectment; in case of non-payment of rent, I will be liable to ejectment; will not carry out any repain without the written permission of the owner of the house; will pay the bill for electricity; . . . will do nothing against law in the rooms; will not take any subtenant and put him in possession."

These are the conditions accepted by the appellant in the rent-note. The respondent instituted a suit for ejectment of the appellant on the ground, among others, of having served notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (Act 4 of 1882), terminating the tenancy. One of the defences of the appellant was that the tenancy is to continue till he continues to pay the rent, in other words, according to him, it is not a case of a lease from month to month. In his plaint the respondent, without giving the detailed terms of the rent-note, has made reference to it and relied upon it. In his written statement the appellant has admitted the execution of the tent-note but again, without referring to the material terms of the same so that without reference to the terms and conditions in the rent-note, Ex. P-I, effect cannot be given to the defence of the appellant.

It appears that in the trial Court no question about the inadmissibility of the rent-note for want of registration arose. The suit of the respondent having been dismissed by a decree, made on August 11, 1964, by a Third Class Subordinate Judge of Amritsar, the respondent filed a first appeal against the decree which was heard and disposed of by the Senior Subordinate Judge at Amritsar on November 28, 1964, and the judgment of the learned Judge shows that the question of registration of this document did come in for consideration before him. He was of the opinion that the tenancy created by the rent-note was a tenancy-at-will. On that consideration, of course, the rent-note did not require registration. The appeal of the respondent was accepted and his suit was decreed by the learned Senior Subordinate Judge.

In second appeal by the appellant, the question has arisen whether the rent-note, Exhibit P-l, is not admissible in evidence for want of registration. My learned brother, Mahajan, J., has considered this question and, in view of certain conflict of authorities, has made a reference of this question alone to a larger Bench, and this is how this second appeal comes before us for disposal of this question.

3. A lease, according to Section 105 of Act 4 of 1882, is a transfer for consideration of a right to enjoy the demised property. Obviously, the right transferred in such a property is transferred by the lessor in favour of the lessee. As in any other transfer, so in this type of transfer, the transferor or the lessor lays his conditions of limitation, if any, on the extent of the right transferred. The right vesting in the lessee can thus only be limited at the time of the transfer, for the matter of the transfer, by him, and equally obviously enough not by the transferee or the lessee. The Utter can, of course, accept any conditions subject to which he takes the transfer, but the extent of the right transferred is determined by the transfer in that respect made by the lessor,











Click Here to Read the rest of this document
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
whatsapp-icon Back to top