1966 Supreme(P&H) 48
PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
D.Falshaw and D.K.Mahajan JJ.
Daulat Ram
Versus
Surinder Kumar
Letter Patent Appeal No. 376 of 1964,
Decided On : FEBRUARY 23, 1966
A guardian's power to enter into a contract on behalf of a minor ceases when the minor attains majority.
Headnote:
GUARDIAN AND WARD - CONSENT DECREE - MINORITY - GUARDIAN'S POWER TO ENTER INTO COMPROMISE - MINOR ATTAINING MAJORITY BEFORE COMPROMISE - VALIDITY OF COMPROMISE - SECTION 11, GUARDIANS AND WARDS ACT, 1890.
Fact of the Case:
A consent decree was passed in a suit where a minor was represented by a guardian. The minor attained majority before the compromise was entered into. The question arose whether the guardian could enter into a valid compromise in such circumstances.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that a guardian cannot enter into a valid compromise on behalf of a minor who has attained majority. Such a compromise is not binding on the minor and can be avoided by the minor in appropriate proceedings.
Issues: Whether a guardian of a minor could enter into a compromise with the leave of the Court when, at the time, the compromise is entered into, the minor had attained majority and had ceased to be a minor.
Ratio Decidendi: A consent decree is a decree passed on the basis of a contract. A guardian's power to enter into a contract on behalf of a minor ceases when the minor attains majority. Therefore, a guardian cannot enter into a valid compromise on behalf of a minor who has attained majority.
Final Decision: The consent decree was set aside insofar as the minor was concerned. The question of the effect of this order on the consent decree, so far as the other parties to it were concerned, was left open.
D.K.Mahajan, J.
1. This is an appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent and is directed against the decision of learned Single Judge of this Court reversing, on appeal, the decision of the lower appellate Court deciding the appeal on compromise.
2. A consent decree was passed on the 24th December, 1962 in the lower appellate Court, Surinder Kumar was a party to that appeal. He was a minor at the time when the appeal directed against the decree in that suit was compromised. In that suit, he was represented by a guardian. He attained majority on 2nd December, 1961 as has been found by the District Judge in his report dated the 18th November, 1963. This report was called by the learned Single Judge by his order dated 13th September, 1963 It is, therefore, clear that on the date the appeal was compromised, Surinder Kumar was not a minor.
3. The short question that fell for determination before the learned Single Judge was whether a guardian of a minor could enter into a compromise with the leave of the Court when, at the time, the compromise is entered into, the minor had attained majority and had ceased to be a minor. The learned Single Judge has held that in such circumstances, the quondam guardian cannot enter into a valid compromise and even if it is entered into, it is not binding on the minor and the minor can avoid it in appropriate proceedings The learned Single Judge has, in this connection, based his decision on a Division Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Sanyasi V/s. Yerran Naidu, AIR 1928 Mad 294 and has preferred this decision to a decision of the Lahore High Court in Ghulam Nabi V/s. Basheshar Mal, AIR 1922 Lah 407, which had taken a contrary view. There is also a Division Bench decision of the Mysore High Court reported as Nanjiah v Maregowda, AIR 1952 Mys 134. where precisely the same question fell for determination. The Mysore Court has considered both the Lahore and the Madras decisions and has preferred to follow the Madras decision. It will be proper, therefore, to set out the relevant observations of the Mysore Court on this matter:
"The first point for consideration is whether a decree on the basis of a compromise entered into by the next friend of the minor plaintiffs is binding on one of the plaintiffs who had attained majority before the compromise. It has been laid down by Le Rossignol J. in AIR 1922 Lah 407 that. A quondam minor cannot maintain a suit for a declaration that a decree passed against him on a compromise accepted on his behalf by his guardian ad litem with the consent of the Court, shall be of no effect, on the ground that at the time of compromise and decree the plaintiff had become sui juris, and consequently was not represented before the Court. A minor party who at the date of decree has attained majority may not impeach a decree passed against him by a separate suit on the ground of fraud or gross negligence of his guardian.
The judgment is that of a Single Judge and it must be stated that all that is Stated is that the plaintiff must be regarded an having been an adult judgment-debtor who could have applied for a review of the decree and that he is not competent to maintain a suit to avoid that decree except on grounds of fraud. No reasons are given to show how a decree based on consent cannot be avoided by a suit by a person who was not a party to the consent. As against this decision there has been the judgment in 55 Mad LJ 374: (AIR 1928 Mad 294) in which the question has been considered at some length. It has been observed in that case:
It stands to reason and principle that an adjudication by the Court which, we may take it, in the absence of any fraud, collusion or gross negligence is an adjudication on the merits of the controversy, need not be set aside as vitiated merely because a certain defendant is found to have attained his majority without the matter being brought to the notice of the Court. But when the decree comes to be passed on a contract it beco