Removal of a member of a Market Committee for misconduct under the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939, is deemed to be removal under Section 15 of the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961, and disqualifies the person from standing for election to the Committee.

S.S.Dulat, J.

1. The appellant, Hukam Singh, was a member of the Market Committee at Rewari set up under the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939 . He was removed from that office by the State Government on account of misconduct under Section 11 of that Act. The order of the State Government was made on the 16th of June 1958. The Act of 1939 was repealed by the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961, which Act replaced the previous Act. Elections to the Market Committee, Rewari, under the new Act were held during August 1963 and the appellant stood for election. An objection was taken that the appellant was disqualified on account of his removal for misconduct but that objection appears to have been raised after the appellants nomination had actually been accepted by the Returning Officer. Then followed the election at which the appellant was declared successful. One of the defeated candidates--Ram Narain Singh--thereupon brought a writ petition to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the legality of the appellants election. The ground taken was that since the appellant had been removed from membership or the Market Committee on account of misconduct, he was ineligible to seek election under the Act of 1961 and his election was, therefore, unlawful. The writ petition was heard by Harbans Singh, J., sitting alone and the argument raised against the appellants election prevailed, the learned Judge holding that the appellant was not eligible for election to the Market Committee under the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961. On this view the petition was allowed by the learned Judge and the election of the appellant was set aside. Hence the present appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent.

2. Mr. Ram Sarup in support of the appeal points out that the previous Act of 1939 and the Act now in force since 1961 are not identical in their provisions which of course is so. The real resemblance and the only relevant one consists in Section 11 of the old Act which empowered Government to remove any member if that member was in Governments opinion guilty of misconduct or neglect of duty, and Section 15 of the new Act which similarly enables the State Government to remove any member if in its opinion he is guilty of misconduct or neglect of duty. These two provisions are identical in their content. The learned Single Judge has founded his conclusion on this similarity and not on the ground of any general similarity in the other provisions of the two Acts. What the Act of, 1961 says quite clearly is that no person shall be eligible to stand for election to a Market Committee if he has incurred any of the disqualifications mentioned in Sub-section (5) of Section 3 and one of these contained in Clause (c) is that he "has been removed under Sub-section (7) or Section 15". The only question, therefore, is whether the appellant was removed under Section 15 of the present Act of 1961. Before the learned Single Judge it was suggested quite seriously that since the appellant was removed under the provisions of the earlier Act of 1939, it could not be said that he was removed under Section 15 of the present Act of 1961. The argument did not find favour with the learned Single Judge because Section 47 of the Act of 1961 says that, in spite of the repeal of the previous Act of 1939, everything done and every action taken under the repealed Act shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the new Act. In view of this provision, that argument is not so seriously pressed before us by Mr. Ram Sarup. There is no doubt that the removal of the appellant for misconduct, although it in fact took place under the Act of 1939, is in law to be taken to have been made under the Act of 1961, Section 15. There is, therefore, no escape from the conclusion that the appellant had incurred the disqualification mentioned in Sub-section (5) of Section 3 of the Act of 1961 and that operated against his capacity