Acquisition of land for a private company at the company's expense cannot be considered a public purpose under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and the procedure prescribed by Part VII of the Act must be followed in such cases.

1. This is a writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution for the issuance of an appropriate writ in the nature of Certiorari after quashing the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter called the Act) and further proceedings on their basis.

2. The petitioner is owner of 3/4th share of Khasra No. 35/17/5 measuring 6 Marlas, and 1/2 share of Khasra No. 35/17/3, measuring 2 Marlas within the Municipal area of Ropar, Respondent 3 (M/s. The Ambala Bus Syndicate (P) Ltd. Ropar) is a co-sharer owning the remaining shares. The petitioner constructed a building on a part of the land about 40 or 50 hears ago and that portion is recorded in the Jamabandi as Ghair Mumkin Makaan. Dispute arose between the co-sharers over the possession and user of the shop on the land. It is alleged that under the influence of Respondent 3, the State Government (respondent 1) issued the impugned Notification, D/- November,. 20, 1968, published in the Punjab Government Gazette (Copy Annexure A) stating that the land specified therein was likely to be needed for the purpose and at the expense of Ambala Bus Syndicate Private Limited, Ropar namely, for the extension of Bus Stand for Ambala Bus Syndicate Private Limited. The petitioner filed objections under Section 5-A in the form of notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure on 31-1-1969 to the Collector, Ropar. No decision, however, was taken thereon. No opportunity of hearing the objections was afforded to the petitioner nor was any decision taken thereon. On October 9, 1970, the impugned notification, dated September 30, 1970, under Section 6 of the Act was published in the Punjab Government Gazette (Annexure B). It was stated therein that the land was required for the aforesaid Syndicate at the expense of the Syndicate.

3. These acquisition proceedings are being challenged on the ground that they are mala fide and the provisions of the Act have been invoked as a colourable exercise of jurisdiction to acquire immovable property for the benefit of a private person and not for a public purpose.

4. In the return, it is admitted that the land is being acquired for the purpose of the private Company (Respondent 3) for its Bus Stand. It is not denied that no part of the compensation is to be paid out of the public revenue.

5. Shri R. K. Chhibber, Learned counsel for the respondents, has very frankly made available and placed for my perusal, the departmental records. From it, it is crystal clear that the contention of the petitioner viz., that the land is being acquired for the benefit of the Private Company (Respondent 3) at the latters expense, is factually correct.

6. Shri S. K. Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the provisions of the Act can be invoked for acquiring land either for a public purpose, or for a Company. But if the land is to be acquired for a public purpose, an essential condition is that the compensation should be paid wholly or partly out of public revenue, and it is to be acquired for a Company, at the latters expense, it is mandatory for the authorities to follow the procedure laid down in Chapter VII of the Act. It is maintained that the impugned proceedings do not adopt either of these courses. Stress has been laid on the fact that not a penny towards this acquisition is going to be contributed out of public revenue and that the entire compensation, according to the admission of the respondents, is to be paid by the Company. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has referred to Pandit Jhandu Lal V/s. The State of Punjab AIR 1961 SC 343; and Shyam Behari V/s. The State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1965 SC 427.

7. Mr. R. K. Chhibber, learned counsel for the respondents has no quarrel with the statement of law on the point made by the petitioners counsel.

8. The following stark facts are not disputed in this case:-

-

(1) The impugned notifications under Sections 4 and 6 do not even make a pre