The Central Government is not bound by the principles of natural justice while summarily disposing of a petition under Section 33 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, as the power under Section 33 is of a residuary nature and the rule-making authority intended to negate the right of hearing in such cases.

Sharma, J.

1. As common questions of law arise in these three cases, namely, L. P. A. No. 12 of 1968, C. W. No. 1090 of 1969 and C. W. No. 3106 of 1968, all these cases can be disposed of by one judgment, which we propose to do.

2. L. P. A. No. 12 of 1968 arises out of C. W. No. 1631 of 1962. Mehta Lal Chand, petitioner in that petition, was a displaced person from West Pakistan. He was entitled to allotment of agricultural land in lieu of the land left behind by him. While he was still an unsatisfied allottee, he made a report to the Rehabilitation authorities that Suchet Singh (now represented by his successors after his death) had received double allotment in different villages and that his allotment in village Dhut Kalan, being unreserved, should be cancelled and the same land be allotted to the petitioner. The claim of the petitioner was negatived by the subordinate Rehabilitation Authorities. He filed a petition before the Government under Section 33 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 (hereinafter called the Act). This petition was dismissed by the Central Government in a summary manner without affording any hearing to the petitioner. He challenged this order in the above mentioned writ petition, which came up for hearing before a Single Bench of this Court who, vide his order dated October 6, 1967 dismissed the same. The learned Single Judge following an earlier Division Bench judgment of this Court in Ranjit Singh V/s. Union of India, 1962-64 Punj LR 44, held that the Central Government was not called upon to give a personal hearing to the petitioner before deciding his petition under Section 33 of the Act.

3. Feeling aggrieved against the order of the learned Single Judge, the appellant has come up in appeal before this Court.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. H. S. Gujral, has vehemently argued that the view taken in the earlier Division Bench judgment is not correct and the same deserves to be reconsidered. According to him, principles of natural justice were attracted to the facts and circumstances of this case and since the Central Government passed an order adversely were bound to accord him a hearing. The powers exercised by the Central Government u/s 33 of the Act were revisional powers, and his client was entitled to a hearing even if the revision was to be summarily dismissed as Order 41, Code of Civil Procedure, applied to the case by virtue of Rule 105 of the Rules framed under the Act. We see no force in the submission made by the learned counsel and are of the view that the amendment of Rule by which the proviso was added to this in 1963 has set the matter beyond any pale of controversy. What remains to be seen is whether the Central Government is bound by the principles of natural justice while summarily disposing of a petition under Section 33 of the Act or not.

5. The matter regarding the applicability of principles of natural justice has been authoritatively dealt with in Union of India V/s. J. N. Sinha, 1970 Serv LR 748=(AIR 1971 SC 40), by the Supreme Court of India in the following terms:-

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"As observed by this Court in A. K. Kraipak V/s. Union of India, 1969 Serv LR 445=(AIR 1970 SC 150), the aim of rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words they do not supplant the law but supplement it. It is true that if a statutory provision can be read consistently with the principles of natural justice, the Courts should do so because it must be presumed that the legislatures and the statutory authorities intend to act in accordance with the principles of natural justice. But if on the other hand a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of any or all the principles of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the legislature or the statut