An admission made by a party in a previous suit is binding on that party in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies, unless the admission is shown to be erroneous or made under circumstances that entitle the party to claim that it should not be acted upon.

, J.

1. This petition for revision of the order dated the 17th of June, 1972, passed by Shri Aftab Singh, Additional District Judge, Ludhiana, has arisen in these circumstances. The petitioner before me is one of the two defendants in the case, both of whom are the sons of the plaintiff-respondent whose suit is for a declaration to the effect that she is the owner in possession of a third share in house No. B-IV-843 situated in Wait Ganj, Ludhiana and that she is in exclusive possession of portion of that house consisting of two rooms and a kitchen and shown red in the plan accompanying the plaint. She has also prayed for the issuance of a permanent injunction restraining both the defendants from interfering with her exclusive possession till partition of the house and restraining defendant No. 1 from dispossessing her in execution of a decree obtained by him against defendant No. 2. The suit is based on the allegation that the house in dispute was allotted to the parties in lieu of property left by Ganesh Dass, the husband of the plaintiff, and of the property inherited by her from her parents, in West Pakistan. According to the averments in the plaint, the defendants acknowledged the plaintiff to be a joint owner of the house in dispute in an agreement executed by the parties on the 4th of September, 1961. The plaintiff claims to have been in continuous possession of the portion shown red in the plan above-mentioned since the year 1955 and to have, therefore, acquired ownership thereof by adverse possession also. It is common ground between the parties that in a suit filed against defendant No. 2 by defendant No.1 the latter obtained a decree for possession of a portion of the house. The plaintiff has pleaded that that decree had been obtained by misrepresentation, that the plaintiff was no party thereto and that it could not be executed as against her.

Defendant No. 1 resisted the suit with the averments that the plaintiff was not in possession of any portion of the house in her own right, that she was residing with defendant No. 2 against whom the decree above-mentioned had been obtained and that she did not have any share in the house. According to defendant No. 1, the plaintiff had colluded with defendant No. 2 and that was why she had brought the suit.

The plaintiff made an application under Section 151 and Rules 1 and 2 of Order XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure for the issuance of a temporary injunction restraining defendant No. 1 from dispossessing the plaintiff in execution of the decree above-mentioned. He application was initially granted by the trial Court but the temporary injunction was later on vacated for the reasons that the plaintiff had been shown to have stated in an earlier suit brought by defendant No. 2 against defendant No. 1 that she had no share in the house in dispute which was jointly owned by the two defendants and that the present litigation was the result of collusion between the plaintiff and defendant No. 2. The plaintiff filed an appeal which was accepted by the learned Additional District Judge who issued the temporary injunction prayed for through the impugned order holding that-

(a) the plaintiff had a prima facie case by reason of the acknowledgment made by the defendants in the agreement dated the 4th of September, 1961, to the effect that the house in dispute was jointly owned by all the parties and such prima facie case was not displaced by the admission of the plaintiff in the previous suit between the two defendants because she was no party to that suit and had the right to be afforded an opportunity to explain that admission.

(b) the mere production of a certified copy of the statement of the plaintiff containing the admission did not prove the admission.

(c) the plaintiff had been in possession of the property for more than 12 years and had, therefore also, a prima facie case, and

(d) the balance of convenience was in favour of the plaintiff who was a 60 years old woman