The jurisdiction of civil courts to entertain suits relating to evacuee property is barred under Section 46 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950. The Custodian of Evacuee Property has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the title to evacuee property.

, J.

1. This is second appeal by Parma Nand and others plaintiffs against Suresh Chand and others defendants. The appeal has arisen out of a suit filed by Parma Nand for permanent injunction restraining Suresh Chand and Nem Chand defendants from interfering with the possession of agricultural land measuring 7 bighas and 17 biswas situate in the revenue estate of Hissan. In the alternative, the plaintiffs also sued for possession of that land. The suit was dismissed by the trial Court. On appeal, the lower appellate Court upheld the judgment and decree of the trial Court. Facts leading to the appeal are as follows:-

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2 On October 17, 1940. Kanwar Sen, father of Suresh Chand and Nem Chand sold the land in dispute to Ali Mohammed for Rs. 6,500 by a registered sale deed. Consequent on partition of the country, Ali Mohammed migrated in 1947 to Pakistan. That land standing in revenue records in the name of Ali Mohammed was declared to be evacuee property and vested in the Custodian. On March 24,1955, the land vested under Section 12 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, hereinafter called the Act in the Central Government. On February 16,1957,Suresh Chand filed suit by impleading Union of India as defendant for declaration to the effect that the sale of the land by his father in favour of Ali Mohammed was without consideration and legal necessity and the sale proceeds had been frittered away by the vendor for immoral purposes. On February 25, 1958, the land was, under Section 20 of the Act, put to sale by the Managing Officer at Public auction. The highest bid of Rs. 49,100 of Parma Nand plaintiff was accepted. He became the owner of the property and was delivered its possession. The Union of India resisted the suit on various pleas. The following issues were struck:-

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"(1) Whether the civil Court has no jurisdiction?

(2) Whether the suit is barred by limitation?

(3) Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi ?

(4) Whether the suit does not lie in the present form ?

(5) Whether the valuation for Court fee and jurisdiction is not correct ?

(6) Whether the property is coparcenary property as alleged ?

(7) Whether the sale in dispute is for consideration, legal necessity and family benefit."

3. The trial Court dismissed the suit. The matter was taken in appeal on February 24, 1959 by Suresh Chand before the District Judge. On May 11, 1959, Suresh Chand made an application saying that Parma Nand had purchased the property at public auction, that being an auction-purchaser, he was claiming to be the owner in possession and that he be impleaded as a party to the appeal. Notice of that application was issued to Parma Nand. Parma Nand appeared and was represented by a counsel. No order was, however, passed for his being impleaded as a party. The appeal was disposed of without his having been made a party to the appeal. On November 10, 1960, the appeal was allowed. As against the finding of the trial Court under issue No. 1 to the effect that civil Court had no jurisdiction, the Court of the District Judge took the view that civil Court had jurisdiction and Section 46 of the Act was no bar to the maintainability of the suit. Having given findings on other issues in favour of the plaintiff, the District Judge, while allowing the appeal, decreed the suit of Suresh Chand. The judgment given by that Court is Exhibit P.1.

4. On January 9, 1961; Parma Nand made an application that the decree passed in favour of Suresh Chand be amended to the extent of his being added as one of the respondents in the array of the parties basing his prayer on the ground that he was auction-purchaser and had interest as owner in possession of the property. He also prayed that in spite of application having been made by Suresh Chand to the effect of his being made a party and notice having been issued to him, he was not impleaded as a respondent.

5. In the order made on March 7, 1961 as its certified copy Exhibit P, 3 shows, th