The quantum of compensation awarded under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act should be adequate and justified, considering various factors such as the deceased's age, life expectancy, income, and the cut for lump-sum payment.

Bal Raj Tuli, J.

1. Shrimati Surjit Kaur Dhillion, M.A.. aged about 32 years, Lecturer in English in the Lyallpur Khalsa College for Men at Jullundur was killed in an accident at about 12-15 P.M. on July 22, 1967. While she was returning home from her college, she was knocked down by jeep No. P.N.J. 9663 belonging to the Public Health Department of the Punjab Government. Her husband Major Jagjit Singh and her minor son Jasjit Singh aged 6 years filed an application for compensation under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Jullunder City. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 72,765.45 paise as compensation to the two claimants by an award dated April 6, 1970 against which two cross appeals were filed by the State of Punjab and the claimants. Both those appeals were dismissed by the learned Single Judge by order dated March 17, 1972, and the present appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent has been filed by the claimants against that order.

2. The only point that has been argued in the appeal by the learned counsel for the appellants is the quantum of compensation awarded to the appellants. Before the Tribunal, a statement (Annexure A) was filed which showed the amount that the deceased would have earned from July 22, 1967, to July 16, 1993, from the salary according to her scale of pay. The amount worked out is Rs. 1,45,146.67 paise. On July 16, 1993, the deceased would have attained the age of 58 years, but the learned Tribunal was of the opinion that she could be expected to live up to the age of 52 years and allowed compensation on that basis. Upto the attainment of 52 years of age, she would have earned Rs. 1,09,146.67 paise according to Annexure A. To the amount, a cut of 331-3 per cent was applied on account of lump-sum payment of compensation with the result that the net compensation awarded was Rs. 72,764.45 paise. The learned Single Judge upheld that award and we find no reason to differ from the reasoning of the learned Single Judge affirming the decision of the Tribunal. However, the learned counsel for the appellants has emphasised that according to A. W. 11 Pritam Singh, Vice Principal of the College, the scale of pay which the deceased was drawing had been revised about a month prior to her death with the result that she was to get Rs. 428/- per mensem as salary at the time of the accident instead of Rs. 320/- and that the compensation should have been determined on the basis of the revised salary. Another point urged by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the learned Single Judge and the learned Tribunal erred in law in holding that the deceased would have lived up to the age of 52 years and not 55 years or longer. There are cases in which compensation upto the age of 70 years has been allowed. The third point pressed is that the cut of 331-3 per cent is not justified and lastly that the income from private tuition amounting to Rs, 150/- per mensem has not been taken into consideration.

3. Dealing with the longevity of her life, the learned Tribunal and the learned Single Judge have given cogent reasons for coming to the conclusion that the deceased would have probably lived upto to the age of 52 years. Taking into consideration the danger involved in child birth and the fact of her sex, it cannot be said that the reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the learned Single Judge are so preverse in point of fact that we must interfere in Letters Patent Appeal where in the interference is only on points of law or gross errors of fact making the findings of fact perverse. Taking the hazards in life, we cannot say that in every case a woman would live upto the age of 70 years or for that matter upto any age. The accident took place in 1967 and average life of 52 years for a female in this case would be considered reasonable. We, therefore, repel the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellants that the compensation should have been awarded on