The concept of stridhan has not been abolished by the Hindu Succession Act and a female has an absolute right to use her stridhan in any way she likes.

M.R.SHARMA, J.

1. Petitioners Nos. 1 and 2 are the father-in-law and the mother-in-law respectively of the respondent. The latter filed a complaint under S. 406, I. P. C., against them in the Court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chandigarh. In that complaint it was averred that the respondent was married to Iqbal Jang Singh, son of the petitioners, on March 27, 1977, at Chandigarh by Anand Karaj ceremony which is the customary form of marriage prevalent in the community of the parties. At the time of her marriage, the respondent received substantial presents of ornaments, clothes, furniture and other household articles from her parents, relations, her husband and the petitioners. These items of property, over which she had absolute control, according to her, became her stridhan. As a dutiful daughter-in-law of the petitioners, she reposed full faith in them and entrusted all this property to them. She was disallowed the use of the ornaments (which according to the items mentioned in Annexure A to the complaint were of the value of rupees over one lac) on the pretext that "the times were not safe for wearing valuable ornaments."

2. The complaint goes on to state that in June, 1977, Iqbal Jang Singh, husband of the respondent, left for USA on the pretext of a business trip. Before leaving the country, he told the respondent that the ornaments etc. should remain in the safe custody of his parents, i. e., the petitioners. The respondent had no ground to doubt his statement and she acted upon the same, though later on it came to light that it was a plan on the part of her husband with the connivance of his parents to desert the respondent. After the departure of her husband for USA the attitude of the petitioners towards her underwent a complete change and they started taunting her. On Basant Panchmi day, i.e. Feb. 12, 1978, the respondent asked for a set of ornaments for wearing them to celebrate the Basant but the petitioners refused to give any ornaments to her and bluntly told her that she will not be allowed to have those ornaments and articles of dowry for use. She was further taunted and told to bring a lac of rupees from her parents. The behaviour of the petitioners was not only rude but also unbecoming of gentle parties of status. It was also averred that,

"the accused abused and slapped the complainant, forcibly took off the diamond ring, wrist watch, gold necklace and gold ear-rings and forced the complainant to leave the house only in the clothes which the complainant was wearing and told never to return and that the complainant would not get the ornaments and the other articles."

3. After making a mention of certain other facts, the complaint goes on to state that,

"the accused have committed an offence under S. 406, I. P. C. by committing criminal breach of trust of the ornaments and other articles owned by the complainant which are her stridhan which were entrusted to the accused for safe custody and which the accused have dishonestly misappropriated, which offence is cognizable and triable by this Court."

Towards the end, it was prayed that they be tried and suitably punished in accordance with law and the articles mentioned in Annexures A and B be ordered to be returned to her.

4 The order dated March 21, 1978, passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate shows that the respondent besides herself entering the witness-box produced her sister Daljinder Kaur P. W. 2 and Gurinder Singh P. W. 3 in support of the version mentioned in the complaint. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate after making a detailed review of the statement made by the respondent felt satisfied that the petitioners prima facie appeared to have committed an offence under S. 406, I. P. C. They were accordingly ordered to be summoned as accused persons.

5. The two petitioners have filed the instant petition under S. 482, Cr. P. C., with a prayer that the complaint filed by the respondent and the subsequent order dated March 21