PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
R.S.Narula, J.
Sundar Dass
Versus
Gurpartap Dass, Defendant
Civil Revision No. 1732 of 1976,
Decided On : AUGUST 8, 1977
COURT FEES ACT, 1870 - SECTION 7(IV)(C) - SUIT FOR DECLARATION OF MAHANTSHIP AND MANAGEMENT OF AKHARA - VALUATION OF SUIT - SECOND PROVISO TO SECTION 7(IV)(C) - APPLICABILITY - PROPERTY REFERRED TO IN THE PROVISO - MEANING.
Fact of the Case:
Plaintiff filed a suit for a declaration that he is the Mahant Gaddi Nashin Akhara Ghamanda Dass alias Beriwala, and is as such entitled to manage its affairs and realise rents and profits of the immovable property with permanent injunction restraining the defendant from interfering in the management of the Akhara and realising rent from the tenants of the Akhara. The plaintiff valued the suit for purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction at Rs. 130.00. The defendant joined issue with the plaintiff about the said valuation. The trial court held that the suit is governed by Sec. 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act, 1870 (hereinafter called the Act) and that by virtue of the second proviso added thereto by the Punjab amendment, the valuation of the suit for purposes of court-fee is to be worked out under cl. (v) of Sec. 7. The plaintiff challenged the order of the trial court in the High Court, which dismissed the petition. The plaintiff amended his plaint by deleting the words 'to realise rents and profits of the immovable property' from the prayer clause. The defendant again claimed that proper court-fee has not been paid even on the amended plaint. The trial court framed a preliminary issue as to whether the suit is properly valued for purposes of court-fee and decided it against the plaintiff.
Finding of the Court:
The High Court held that the suit is governed by Sec. 7(iv)(c) of the Act and the second proviso thereto is applicable as the relief sought is with reference to property. The court further held that the properties of the Akhara are capable of being valued in the manner contained in Sec. 7(v) of the Act.
Issues: 1. Whether the suit is governed by Sec. 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act, 1870? 2. Whether the second proviso to Sec. 7(iv)(c) is applicable to the suit? 3. Whether the properties of the Akhara are capable of being valued in the manner contained in Sec. 7(v) of the Act?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The suit is governed by Sec. 7(iv)(c) of the Act as the relief sought is for a declaration and a permanent injunction, which is clearly claimed by way of consequential relief. 2. The second proviso to Sec. 7(iv)(c) is applicable to the suit as the relief sought is with reference to property, namely, the properties of the Akhara. 3. The properties of the Akhara are capable of being valued in the manner contained in Sec. 7(v) of the Act as they comprise of lands, houses, etc.
Final Decision: The petition was dismissed with costs.
1. This is a plaintiff s petition for revision of the order of Shri H. R. Nohria, Subordinate Judge First Class, Amritsar, dated 16.10.1976, deciding the preliminary issue about the valuation of the suit for purposes of court-fee. The plaintiff originally filed a suit for a declaration to the effect that he is the Mahant Gaddi Nashin Akhara Ghamanda Dass alias Beriwala, and is as such entitled to manage its affairs and realise rents and profits of the immovable property with permanent injunction restraining the defendant from interfering in the management of the Akhara and realising rent from the tenants of the Akhara in the shops (the underlined portions were later omitted from the amended plaint).
2. The plaintiff had valued the original suit for purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction at Rs. 130.00. The defendant joined issue with the plaintiff about the said valuation. Shri S. K. Chopra, Subordinate Judge First Class, Amritsar, by his order, dated 15.04.1975, deciding that issue, held that the suit is governed by Sec. 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act, 1870 (hereinafter called the Act) and that by virtue of the second proviso added thereto by the Punjab amendment, the valuation of the suit for purposes of court-fee is to be worked out under cl. (v) of Sec. 7. Not satisfied with the order of the trial Court, the plaintiff came up to this Court for revision thereof in Civil Revision No. 785 of 1975. The revision petition was dismissed by this Court (Verma, J.) on 10.02.1976. While dismissing the petition, the learned Judge made it clear that whatever had been said in his order was limited to the disposal of the revision petition, but would not affect the situation which may arise by any amendment of the plaint that may be made by the plaintiff thereafter.
3. With the leave of the trial Court the plaintiff thereafter amended his plaint so as to delete from the heading thereof as well as from the prayer clause the words which I have underlined while quoting the prayer made in the originally unamended plaint. Once again, the defendant claimed that proper court-fee has not been paid even on the amended plaint. A preliminary issue was again framed as to whether the suit is properly valued for purposes of court-fee. That issue has been decided against the plaintiff in the order under revision. The claim of the plaintiff is that the suit is governed by Art. 17 (iii) of the second Schedule to the Act. The case of the respondent is that the suit is governed by Sec. 7 (iv) (c) of the Act. The relevant part of Art. 17 (iii) of the second Schedule reads as follows :-
"Plaint or memorandum of appeal in each of the following suits :-
(i) ...........
(ii) ...........
(iii) to obtain a declaratory Nineteen decree where rupees fifty no consequential Naye Paise."
relief is prayed.
On the other hand S. 1 (iv) (c) of the Act deals with suits to obtain a declaratory decree or order where consequential relief is prayed. The relief prayed for by the plaintiff even in the present suit is for a declaration and for a permanent injunction. The permanent injunction is clearly claimed by way of consequential relief. This is not a suit for a declaration simpliciter and the question of application of Art 17 (iii) of the second Schedule does not arise.
4. Good deal of arguments have been addressed by Mr. R. S. Bindra, the learned Senior Advocate for the plaintiff-petitioner, but all those arguments are based on the assumption that the suit is governed by Sec. 7 (iv) (c). All those arguments are directed towards showing that notwithstanding the finding that the suit is governed by and 7 (iv) (c) the second proviso thereto has no application to the case as the reliefs claimed in this suit are not "with reference to any property" and further that in fact no "property" is involved in this suit.
5. The second proviso to Sec. 7 (iv) (c) is in the following terms :-
"Provided further that in suits coming under sub-cl. (c), in cases where the relief sought is
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