The answer to Question No. 52 of the Riwaj-i-am of the Amritsar district, which states that alienation of immovable property acquired by the husband is permissible to the same extent as he could have alienated it, makes a correct exposition of the customary law on the subject.

M.R.SHARMA, J.

1. The facts of the case are succinctly given in the order of reference prepared by P. C. Pandit, J. and need not be stated all over again. The decision of the case depends upon the reply to the following question:-

"Whether the answer to Question No. 52 of the Riwaj-i-am of the Amritsar district, which states that alienation of immovable property acquired by the husband is permissible to the same extent as he could have alienated it makes a correct exposition of the customary law on the subject."

2. In a large number of judgments rendered by this Court it has been laid down that there is no uniform custom applicable to the whole of the Punjab. It varies from tribe to tribe and from place to place. It is also well known that customs relating to the same tribe some times vary from District to District and even in different localities of the same District. It is precisely for this reason that a party relying upon a particular custom is called upon to allege and to prove that custom. Reference in this connection may be made to Joginder Singh V/s. Kartara, AIR 1936 Lah 551 and Kartar Singh V/s. Mt. Banto, AIR 1936 Lah 804. A Riwaj-i-am normally furnishes a reliable piece of evidence for proving the custom. It is no doubt true that no presumption of truth attaches to it under S. 44 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887, yet, it being a public record prepared by a public officer in discharge of his official duties is admissible in evidence under S. 35 of the Evidence Act. The evidentiary value of Riwaj-i-am varies according to the facts and circumstances of each case. If it records the statements of the persons governed by a particular customs and is also supported by some instances, much greater weight is attached to it. But, when the statements recorded merely show that a particular custom was desired to exist, little or no importance is given to such entries recorded in the Riwaj-i-am. At one time it was held that a Riwaj-i-am which was not supported by instances or which was opposed to general custom should be considered unreliable but in view of the Privy Council decision in Beg V/s. Allah Ditta, AIR 1916 PC 129, this view can no longer be held to be good law. According to the Privy Council, an entry in a Riwaj-i-am even if unsupported by instances is a strong piece of evidence in support of that custom and it lies on the person denying the custom to rebut that evidence.

3. On a parity of reasoning it must be held that entries in a Riwaj-i-am, which pertain to a special custom applicable to a locality or a class of persons, should also be presumed to be correct unless rebutted. The principle is that an official record, kept by a person, upon whom there is a public duty to make entries in it only after satisfying himself of the truth of those entries, is presumed to be correct. Such a document itself is evidence of the truth of its contents unless and until its falsity can be demonstrated by any of the various methods by which the evidentiary value of any public book, register or document may be attacked. This initial presumption is, however, weakened when the custom recorded in the Riwaj-i-am is opposed to the general custom or the same is opposed to the rights of the females who had not been consulted at the time of the compilation of the Riwaj-i-am. However weak this presumption may be, it is sufficient to shift the burden of proof on the party who challenges the existence of such a custom and the presumption can be rebutted only by proof of instances in which such a custom had been departed from by the members of community. In short, it is the will of the community which establishes and abrogates a custom as observed by Robertson, J. in Daya Ram V/s. Sohel Singh, 110 0 PunRe 1906 :-

"We must also recognise that customary law like other law, is a branch of sociology and must be in a fluid state and take cognizance of progress of ethical and legal notions in the community in which it is in force."

Consequ