IMPORTANT POINT
Quashing of FIR--Criminal Tresspass--Allegations of taking forcible possession of Land--Complainant on civil side lost upto Supreme Court--Earlier FIR lodged against predecessor-in-interest of petition on similar allegation culminated into acquittal of accused--Filing of FIR to defeat vested civil rights of petitioner quashed.

AJAI LAMBA, J.

1. This petition under Sec.482, Code of Criminal Procedure, has been filed for quashing of FIR No.107 dated 27.3.2008 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 323, 452, 448, 506, 511, Indian Penal Code, Police Station, City Thanesar, district Kurukshetra (Annexure P-1) and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom.

2. The facts are intricate, as given out by the learned counsel for the petitioners.

3. The petitioners, it seems, purchased a piece of land from one tarlok Singh in the year 2006. Vijay Kumar, complainant/respondent No.2 claims to be the tenant on the property. Further claim is that earlier to complainant/respondent No.2, his father Dharambir was a tenant on the property.

4. The facts, as given out, are that Tarlok Singh (predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners) entered into an agreement to sell the property on 21.12.1984 with Dharambir, father of complainant/respondent No.2. Since the sale deed was not executed in terms of the agreement, said Dharambir brought a suit for specific performance of agreement dated 21.12.1984. After litigation running into 12 years, the Honble Supreme Court of India adjudicated in favour of Tarlok Singh, vide judgment placed on record as Annexure P-4. The Honble supreme Court of India has held in the following terms:-

". . . . . . We find force in the stand of appellant. We think that parties had, by agreement, determined the date for performance of the contract. Thereby limitation began to run from April 6, 1986. Suit merely for injunction laid on December 23, 1987 would not be of any avail nor the limitation began to run from that date. Suit for perpetual injunction is different from suit for specific performance. The suit for specific performance in fact was claimed by way of amendment application filed under Order 6, Rule 17 CPC on September 12, 1979. It will operate only on the application being ordered. Since the amendment was ordered on August 25, 1989 the crucial date would be the date on which the amendment was ordered by which date, admittedly, the suit is barred by limitation. The courts below, therefore, were not right in decreeing the suit. . . . . . . "

5. Under the circumstances, Dharambir could not have enforced the agreement to sell.

6. It seems that, in the meanwhile, sale deed had been executed. Litigation for cancellation of the sale deed was brought. Since the agreement to sell itself could not be enforced through a suit for specific performance, the sale deed was cancelled. Under the above circumstances, Dharambir continued to claim himself to be in possession of the land as a tenant under the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners. It seems that complainant/respondent No.2 lodged FIR No.592 dated 25.8.1997 against Surjit singh son of Tarlok Singh and three others, alleging therein that he was owner of Sabharwal Rice Mills. He was in possession of a piece of land. The land was leased to complainant/respondent No.2 by Tarlok Singh, etc. When complainant/respondent No.2 had gone to Delhi, he was informed that an attempt had been made by the accused to take forcible possession of the land. They had, however, been stopped by the workers working for complainant/respondent No.2. The accused had also given a threat to take forcible possession on getting a chance. Challan was filed and the accused therein were tried. The trial Court, vide judgment (Annexure P- 5), in regard to possession, has concluded in the following terms:-

". . . . . . . Regarding the possession PW-6 has clearly deposed that the complainant could not produce any documentary proof regarding title of the land with the complainant. Thus, the prosecution could not prove any of the charges levelled against the accused beyond all the shadows of reasonable doubt. Even the presence of accused at the spot is doubtful. . . . . ."

7. Resultantly, all the accused were acquitted. It needs to be mentioned that, at this stage also, the allegation made by complainant/respondent No.2 against Surj